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ABSTRACT 
 This research has investigated how the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic 
culture mediates its strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. 
The study employs poststructuralist discourse theory as an intellectual framework and 
examines Estonia’s strategic culture as a discursive context. Poststructuralist discourse 
analysis is utilised in the empirical analysis of Estonian strategic texts. The central 
argument of this study is that drawing on the privileged identity of Western democracy, the 
hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture has rendered a cluster of security 
practices in response to Russian hybrid threat appropriate and “normal”, namely the 
establishment of ETV+, the authorisation of Sputnik operation in Estonia, the partnership 
between Tallinn Television and Pervõi Baltiski Channel, and the public debunking 
practices. At the same time, such a hegemonic articulation excludes the illiberal security 
practices from the strategic frontier, namely censorship, nationalisation of information 
sphere and crackdown on Russia’s media outlets in Estonia. Therefore, Estonia’s strategic 
culture has created conditions of possibility for the minimalist approach to strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. The existing minimal strategic 
response is sustained by the concept of media liberalism. At the same time, the challenging 
political force is trying to disrupt the hegemonic articulation by bringing into play the 
concept of media sovereignty. However, Estonia’s strong Western democratic identity has 
prevented the latter from gaining momentum.     
 
Keywords: strategic culture, poststructuralist discourse analysis, strategic response, 
Estonia, Russian hybrid threat 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The research studies Estonian strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in the 
information sphere by using poststructuralist discourse theory as a theoretical framework. 
In the aftermath of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the discussions in the western 
media and academic circle about Russian hybrid threat grew strikingly noticeable (e.g., 
Chivvis, 2017; Bachmann & Gunneriusson, 2015; Galeotti, 2016). At the same time, the 
military buildup, the employment of the rotating North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) troops, and the increase in military spending in the Baltic states1 and Poland show 
serious apprehension about their security and the stability of the European Union (EU) and 
NATO’s eastern flank. Against this backdrop, it is apparent that those states’ strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat follows the realist logic (Takacs, 2017).  
The puzzle this study aims to address emerges from the realist tradition in 
International Relations (IR). Based on the logic of survival, the realists expect balancing 
and more assertive security policies in response to the rising threats. Observing the current 
security dynamics of the Baltic Sea region, it is clear that Russia is perceived as a threat 
against which states in the region are balancing by employing means at their disposal. The 
realists would, therefore, expect Estonia – as a rational actor – to pursue an assertive 
strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in order to reduce overall strategic 
disadvantages. However, upon a closer inspection into the specific domain of the case of 
Estonia, this simplistic picture presents more complex facets. Estonia does not adhere to the 
realist expectations as it continues to pursue a limited strategic response to Russian hybrid 
threat in the information sphere. The puzzle arises what accounts for this deviancy in the 
information sphere with regard to the manner Estonia counters Russian hybrid threat. 
Whilst the increase of capabilities in the military and security sector has grown 
larger (see e.g., SIPRI, 2017), Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in its 
information sphere is relatively limited. Estonia has immensely invested in its deterrent 
capacities. However, at the same time, neither the media censorship laws nor stricter 
                                                          
1 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
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regulatory framework is publicly entertained in spite of the acknowledgement of Russian 
hybrid threat. Estonia’s behaviour in this respect does not conform to the realist’s balance-
of-threat explanation. In the light of this deviancy, a closer investigation into the country’s 
domestic ideational factors is needed.  
 Theories on the states’ response to the international strategic environment have been 
predominantly developed in the field of strategic studies. This study contends that strategic 
culture is the most suitable concept in tackling the aforementioned puzzle because it 
reorients the research focus to the intervening ideational factors which mediate between 
threats and strategic outcomes. The academic research on strategic culture has been 
bountiful as the literature review of this study shows. However, recently, the significant 
changes in international strategic environment necessitate a broader understanding of the 
concept of strategy and thus strategic culture. This, moreover, reveals that current strategic 
culture literature has not yet bridged this gap.2 Therefore, the study addresses this 
intellectual agenda and endeavours to fill this lacuna. It takes strategic culture as a central 
concept but moves beyond conventional accounts by putting it on a different theoretical 
ground. It further proposes an alternative reading of strategic culture by treating it as a 
discursive phenomenon.  
The study utilises poststructuralist discourse theory as an analytical frame to 
examine how the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture shapes its strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. Accordingly, the intellectual 
landscape of this study is built on the poststructuralist theorising. Within this scheme of 
thought, the study espouses radical constructivism which holds that all semantic categories 
do not have an inherently essential attribute (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001[1985]). It pays a 
particular attention to the conditions of possibility for certain security practices such as 
those measures taken by states in response to perceived threats. From this angle, the 
hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture is always contingent. It enacts 
conditions of possibility for the minimal strategic response based on Western democratic 
identity whilst excluding a set of restrictive security practices which do not conform to such 
                                                          
2 See footnote 11. 
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an identity. In terms of epistemology, the study adopts the position that “to know reality is 
to participate in it” (Dillet, 2017, p. 518). Thus, it questions the objectivity of knowledge. 
RESEARCH PUZZLE 
In the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the discussions on Russian 
hybrid threat in the Baltic states and Poland – amongst others – became heated. The 
disconcertment about security has since been clear in those countries as Russian hybrid 
threat is coupled with the neo-imperialist innuendo (Apetroe, 2016), revanchism, and 
aggressiveness (Jenkins, 2016). This reflects the perception that Russia is a threatening 
power. Hence, from a realist’s theoretical stance, balancing against Russia – as an 
aggressive state – will ensure a survival of the threatened states (Wivel, 2008, p. 297). In 
particular, from the point of view of the smaller states around it, they are expected to follow 
the survival logic. Accordingly, balancing against the perceived threat as a strategic 
response is a viable explanation (Walt, 1985, pp. 8-9). Such a recurrent theme of Walt’s 
theory of balance of threat is, therefore, feasible from this angle. Besides, taking the 
empirical phenomena into consideration, in response to Russian threats, the domestic 
buildup of defence and military capabilities (e.g., internal balancing) in the Baltic states and 
Poland along with the deployment of NATO troops to these states (e.g., external balancing) 
unequivocally point to the realist direction of strategic response. Looking at these states’ 
behaviour, the realist proponents would argue that there exists “Russian threat out there”. 
Therefore, as states are rational, they are expected to act according to their interests. The 
assertive response should, consequently, be expected because it will help mitigate strategic 
disadvantages and improve overall security. This argument is satisfyingly supported by a 
great deal of empirical evidence mentioned above.  
However, zooming in on the domestic level, the picture significantly changes. In 
case of Estonia, despite its information sphere being susceptible to Russian hybrid threat, 
the current strategic response is strangely minimal. For instance, the flow of Russian 
propaganda and disinformation on daily basis in almost all available local Russian media 
outlets encounters limited obstructions (see Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015, pp. 14-18). This 
demonstrates that the balance-of-threat account does not satisfactorily explain this 
10 
 
particular phenomenon as the increase of threat does not eventuate in the capability 
mobilisation and the intensification of response – such as imposing censorship – to ensure 
states’ security. From a regional perspective, Estonia significantly differs from Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland in dealing with Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. In 
this respect, Estonia’s strategic behaviour exhibits deviancy from the general pattern 
premised on the realist’s balance-of-threat theory. It is precisely Estonia’s management of 
Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere that needs further scrutiny and more 
accurate analysis. This is the puzzle the study addresses. In a nutshell, realist explanation 
accounts for why Estonia is balancing but its limited strategic response to Russian hybrid 
threat in the information sphere has not yet been sufficiently tackled. Thus, by researching 
Estonia’s response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere, this study will 
contribute to a more precise analysis of Estonia’s strategic behaviour.        
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research question of this study is: How does strategic culture mediate Estonia’s 
strategic response to Russia’s hybrid threat? Additionally, a complementary sub-question 
is: How did Estonia’s limited response become normal response? Whilst the former asks 
about the conditions of possibility of the response, the latter enquires into how this response 
became considered not only as appropriate but also “normal3”. “Normal” response is 
understood as a response that complies with the discursively-informed standard of 
correctness (Croce & Salvatore, 2017, p. 276). Both questions are embedded in the strand 
of how-possible questions4 which will guide the investigation towards the conditions of 
                                                          
3 Acknowledging that the concept of “normal” is perspectival and contestable, the study stipulates what 
“normal response” is in the context of poststructuralist discourse theory. In the light of poststructuralist 
reading, a standard of correctness is discursively constructed and it renders a certain strategic response 
normal. An inquiry through the lens of normality defined as such will further illuminate how other modes of 
possible strategic response are excluded from the hegemonic articulation. Simply put, the concept of 
normality highlights the disciplining of the significant Other treated as “abnormality” in the discursive 
construction of Estonia’s strategic culture.        
4 My position here is in line with the discursive approach to foreign policy analysis such as Aydın-Düzgit 
(2013), Doty (1993), and Hansen (2006).    
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possibility which enable the hegemonic articulation of strategic culture and a certain mode 
of strategic response to the perceived threat. The study expects the hegemonic articulation 
of states’ strategic culture defines a range of appropriate security practices in response to 
hybrid threat by filtering out security practices which challenge such an articulation.  
From the theoretical expectation, the study contends that the hegemonic articulation 
of Estonian strategic culture minimalises its strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in 
the information sphere. This hegemonic discourse also reproduces Estonia’s Western 
democratic identity5. Therefore, to the extent that a strategic response does not disrupt the 
articulation of its Western democratic identity with which the hegemonic strategic culture 
identifies, it is regarded as an appropriate strategic option. Hence, the existing limited 
security practices are expected to show their Western democratic overtones. The study 
proposes that Estonia’s Western democratic identity is the privileged identity since the 
country keeps reproducing its representation based on such an identity (Mälksoo, 2013, p. 
158; Tambur, 2014). Accordingly, the illiberal security practices are expected to be filtered 
out.   
In the light of the research questions, this study has defined two objectives. First, it 
aims at explaining how the strategic culture of Estonia mediates its strategic response to 
Russian hybrid threat in its information sphere through the analytical frame of 
poststructuralist discourse theory. Second, it seeks to elucidate how the hegemonic 
articulation of the Estonian strategic culture creates conditions of possibility for certain 
security practices to become appropriate and “normal” strategic options. Both objectives 
will further shed light on Estonia’s strategic behaviour at a particular moment in time.  
In order to achieve these goals, the study utilises a poststructuralist approach to 
strategic culture as a theoretical framework because it facilitates an analysis which 
addresses the multiple possibilities of the framing of strategic response. The practice of 
strategic framing, in turn, informs how states should respond to the perceived threat. 
                                                          
5 The Western liberal democratic identity consists in the following qualities; “individual freedom, political 
participation, private property, and equality of opportunity” (Doyle, 1986, p. 1152). 
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Accordingly, the theoretical amalgam of poststructuralist discourse theory and strategic 
culture can help to explain why certain strategic choices – amongst the possible – are 
filtered out and deemed unsuitable although they seem to produce the best strategic 
outcome, i.e., it is the most efficient solution to enhance states’ overall security. The study 
will also illustrate that the interpretive frame developed in this research can better capture 
the politico-cultural dynamics in strategic considerations in the nonmilitary strategic 
environment. Furthermore, this theoretical framework allows a treatment of strategic 
culture as a discursive phenomenon and thus takes discourses as objects of analysis. 
Specifically, those discourses can be located “at the level of explicit articulations” (Hansen, 
2006, p. 41). This reveals the theoretical assumption of the study which embraces the 
ontological and epistemological primacy of discourses. 
This study, moreover, demonstrates the theorisation of the relationship between 
discourse, identity and strategic culture provides a firm conceptual ground for an analysis 
of Estonia’s strategic response to Russia’s hybrid threat. In particular, analysing the 
interplay between strategic culture and identity through the rubric of poststructuralist 
discourse theory will shed light on the appropriateness-in-making and normalisation of a 
certain mode of strategic response to the perceived threat. The study further elucidates how 
the concept of Russian hybrid threat is articulated by Estonia’s public discourses. This 
helps to specify the scope of such a concept in the context of this study. All in all, the study 
attempts to show that the poststructuralist reading of strategic culture provides a precise 
understanding of Estonia’s strategic behaviour in the context of Russia’s hybrid threat in its 
information sphere. Through this approach, the mediating effects of the discursive context 
are exposed and entertained. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The remainder of this chapter presents critical reviews of two strands of relevant 
literature, namely the literature on Baltic states’ response to Russian hybrid threat and 
literature on the theoretical approach to the study of strategic culture.  
13 
 
In the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the study of the new type of 
warfare in which Russia employed a wide array of unconventional military tactics together 
with conventional operations in warfare against Ukraine has proliferated.6 Such hybrid 
military operations coupled with Russia’s aggressiveness in its traditional sphere of 
influence trigger scholarly discussions on how the Baltic states and the West can (or 
should) respond to Russia’s hybrid threat.    
Currently, there are two major research orientations which investigate how the 
Baltic states have responded to the potential (and existential) Russia’s hybrid threat, namely 
the policy-oriented research with practical suggestions, if not solutions, and the theory-
oriented research which attempts to explain Baltic states’ strategic response within a 
context of a particular theory. The former includes scholars such as Bērziņš (2014), Hurt 
(2014), Lanoszka (2016), Szymański (2015), and Takacs (2017). They generally suggested 
that the increase in both self-defence capabilities of the Baltic states and NATO’s readiness 
in collective defence operations are needed to counter Russia’s hybrid threat. However, 
Thornton & Karagiannis (2016) argued that the increase in building up defence capabilities 
is counterproductive. Regarding the latter, Vilson (2016) posited Estonia’s response to 
Russia’s disinformation within the Europeanisation framework whereas Männik (2013) and 
Paulauskas (2013) pointed to the conceptual framework of collective security (e.g., NATO 
membership) in explaining Estonia’s response to information-related threats posed by 
Russia. Bartkowski (2015) employed the theory of strategic nonviolent conflict to explain 
Lithuania’s response by publishing the manual which provides practical guidance for 
Lithuanian people in the scenario of foreign invasion. Jurkynas (2014) pointed out that due 
to Estonia’s historical experience during the Soviet occupation, it tends to implement 
assertive security policies in response to Russian threats. In addition, Mölder (2014) 
explained Estonia’s strategic culture in relation to its active participation in the international 
peace operations. This again hints at Estonia’s response to international security 
environment through the collective security framework. What remain unattended by those 
studies are the conditions of possibility in which a certain cluster of strategic response is 
                                                          
6 See footnote 14. 
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deemed as the most viable and appropriate option. Moreover, the research that investigates 
strategic response from the discursive angle remains scant. It is this study’s objective to fill 
this lacuna. It will provide a more nuanced interpretive frame which facilitates an analysis 
of the conditions that enable (or constrain) the hegemonic articulation of strategic culture 
which, in turn, mediates states’ strategic response to the perceived threat.  
A number of scholarships on strategic culture have contributed to the theorisation of 
the relationships between domestic ideational factors and states’ strategic behavior. They 
can be broadly categorised into three clusters as follows: first, culture and historical 
experiences informing states’ strategic response to the conflicting international security 
environment (see e.g., Gilboy & Heginbotham (2012) on the comparison of Chinese and 
Indian strategic culture in the context of major power competitions in Asia, Norheim-
Martinsen (2012) on the military component of EU’s security policies, and Das (2009) on 
the constructivist approach to India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy); second, the legitimate 
use of force and threat (see e.g., Dalgaard-Neilsen (2005) on German strategic culture and 
the refusal to support the US-led war in Iraq and Echevarria II (2011) on American 
strategic culture and its strategic preferences in warfare); third, the role of armed forces (see 
e.g., Showalter (2013) on the strategic cultures of European powers during the Interwar 
period.) However, this body of research rests on the narrow definition of strategy, 
regardless of their epistemological and methodological standing. Although the critical 
undertakings of strategic culture which address the emerging analytical challenges due to 
the changing nature of warfare have surfaced recently such as Adamsky (2018) on Russia’s 
strategic culture in relation to hybrid warfare, they remain marginal. This study aims not 
merely at contributing to the critical spectrum of strategic culture scholarship but also 
putting forth a disciplinary critique by highlighting the need to broaden the concept of 
strategy.  
This study is structured as follows. The first chapter elucidates the theoretical 
framework of this study and engages with a clarification of the important concepts used in 
this study. The second chapter maps out the methodological outlook of the study. It 
comprises of research design, selection of texts, and method of analysis. The interpretive 
15 
 
frame is also elaborated in this chapter. The third chapter shows the empirical analysis of 
discourses and the logical linkage between Russian hybrid threat and Estonian strategic 
response with strategic culture as a discursive intervention. The conclusion discusses the 
findings, the theoretical implications and the avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACH 
TO STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Before discussing the theoretical framework, a few reflections on the realist 
explanation are provided. It is obvious that in the context of conventional warfare, the 
realist explanation is still relevant in tackling the issue of strategic response. What is more, 
it is evident that Estonia’s strategic response to Russian threats at large can be sufficiently 
explained through the theoretical framework of realism. Such responses include, for 
instance, the retaining of conscription, the active involvement in NATO, the increase in 
military expenditure – to name but a few. However, the scope of this study is clearly 
defined to account for Estonia’s strategic response to Russia’s hybrid threat in the 
information sphere. To re-emphasise, it is this particular angle that manifests deviancy from 
the realist expectations. Engaging with Russian hybrid threat in this particular sphere needs 
a more nuanced analytical approach which is sensitive to the domestic ideational factors 
which influence states’ response to the perceived threats in the nonmilitary strategic 
environment. In the light of this state of affairs, the poststructuralist approach to strategic 
culture which focuses on the imprint of identity on a certain strategic response will entail an 
additional understanding of states’ strategic behaviour. In short, it investigates the factors 
that realist explanation either takes them for granted or treats them as a given. 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORISATION OF STRATEGIC CULTURE  
The traditional study of strategic culture generally either presupposes a prior 
existence of states’ security culture or disregards the conditions of possibility through 
which a certain mode of strategic culture has become dominant. Alternatively, this study 
introduces a discursive approach which can be utilised in the critical research on strategic 
culture. This approach enables an analysis that reveals how the responsive dispositions to 
the perceived threat and particular modes of strategic culture are made possible and 
subsequently reproduced (Doty, 1993). This approach to strategic culture is thus formulated 
in a manner that resonates with this study’s research questions.   
17 
 
This section offers a conceptual reformulation of strategic culture by arguing that 
the conception of strategic culture as a discursive phenomenon helps to disclose how the 
hegemonic articulation of strategic culture mediates Estonia’s strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat. The conceptual reorganisation provides the two-pronged broadening of 
strategic culture. On the one hand, it aims at basing the concept of strategic culture on the 
poststructuralist theoretical ground, on the other, broadening the understanding of the 
notion of strategy in strategic culture. In particular, the former has a significant implication 
on the enquiry of strategic culture – how strategic culture should be studied. 
The first step is to problematise the widely accepted conceptualisation of strategic 
culture and point out that drawing on the privileged identity, a certain mode strategic 
culture enables a cluster of security practices to become the appropriate and “normal” 
strategic response. On the contrary, those challenging the hegemonic articulation of this 
strategic culture will be filtered out. The second step is to illustrate how the broadening of 
the concept of strategy in strategic culture opens up an opportunity to include into the 
analysis nonmilitary security matters – such as Russian hybrid threat in information sphere, 
to which this study attends. The final step is to elucidate the dynamic interplay between the 
concept of discourse, identity and strategic culture which generates the mediating effects on 
states’ response to the perceived threat.   
WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE? 
The concept of strategic culture – coined in the late 1970s by Snyder to explain the 
ideational factors influencing the Soviet Union and the United States’ nuclear strategy 
(Snyder, 1977) – has been widely utilised in the analysis of states’ strategic behaviour. 
Being an alternative to the rationalist and systemic explanation, strategic culture approach 
deals with the ideational factors at the domestic level and provides a cultural account that 
sheds better light on why states strategically act in the way they do. Generally, the 
questions revolving around the concept of strategic culture concern with the relationship 
between states’ culture and their foreign and security policies (Duffield, 1999, p. 765). 
Hence, the epistemological locus of strategic culture approach encompasses states’ 
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domestic ideational factors such as historical experience, national identity and political 
culture.  
The bulk of strategic culture literature generally agrees on the definition of strategic 
culture as the historico-cultural predispositions of the perception of war and peace and the 
use of force (Ball, 1993; Krause, 1999, pp. 11-13), a context that gives meaning to strategic 
behaviour (Gray, 1999, p. 51), a national strategic style based on political culture (Lantis, 
2002), and the symbolic systems of conception of long-term strategic preferences/strategic 
options with respect to military force (Johnston, 1995, p. 46; Rosa, 2014, pp. 91-92). 
Drawing on the above definitions, the study has identified three crucial discursive 
dimensions of strategic culture, namely political culture, national identity, and historical 
experience discourse. These discourses will be analysed in relation to Estonia’s strategic 
posture in dealing with Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. Although the 
insights provided by the existing strategic culture literature have considerably contributed 
to the understanding of states’ strategic behaviour, there are two shortcomings that need be 
addressed, namely the insensitivity to the conditions of possibility of a certain mode of 
strategic culture in the rationalist approach and the narrowed definition of the concept of 
strategy.   
PROBLEMATISING STRATEGIC CULTURE (I): RETHINKING THE 
APPROACH 
Johnston (1995) had divided strategic culture literature into three generations. The 
first generation tried to explain the cultural differences between Soviet and American 
strategic behaviour in relation to their nuclear strategies. The second generation focused on 
the historically produced instrumentality of strategic culture in establishing political 
hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-making. The third generation highlighted the 
theoretical and methodological shortcomings of the first two generations and endeavoured 
to make strategic culture a testable theory.7 In short, the first and the third generation 
                                                          
7 See Zaman (2009) for a delineation and chronical explanation of each generation’s characteristics and 
conceptual strengths and weaknesses.  
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assumed that ideational factors – be it ideology, historical experience, or culture – are a 
given, meaning that they are treated as an unquestioned precondition for a particular 
strategic culture. On the contrary, the second generation questioned those given categories 
and exposed the “cultural hegemony” in a certain politico-military strategy (Klein, 1988, p. 
136). However, they did not delve into how identity has become a source of legitimacy for 
that cultural hegemony. Moreover, the three generations share a predominant focus on the 
military aspects of strategic culture such as the role of armed forces, the experiences of war 
and peace, and the civil-military relations, to name but a few (Krause, 1999, pp. 15-16).    
In the sub-discipline of strategic culture, the debate between Johnston and Gray on 
how the relationship between strategic culture and strategic behaviour should be theorised 
marks a point of departure for the conceptual discussion of strategic culture. Johnston 
exhibited a positivist leaning and sought to formulate a causal and falsifiable strategic 
culture theory (Johnston, 1995). On the contrary, Gray contended that “strategic culture can 
be conceived of as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic 
behaviour” (Gray, 1999, p. 51). Otherwise stated, for Gray, strategic culture is a context in 
which causal relationships are established. Therefore, neither can it be reduced to the cause 
nor effect.    
There are two major limitations pertaining to Johnston and Grey’s treatment of 
strategic culture. First, with regard to Johnston and positivist strategic cultural scholarships 
at large, they have overlooked the question how a certain mode of strategic culture has 
become dominant. This suggests their presupposition of the pre-existing strategic culture 
which is objectively identifiable. This view downplays the inclusionary/exclusionary 
dimension in the formation of states’ strategic response to the perceived threat. For 
instance, certain security practices are deemed as appropriate response whilst others are 
marginalised since they are regarded as unsuitable response. Therefore, the political 
struggle over the hegemonic status of strategic culture remains unattended. Second, 
although Grey accepted that analysing strategic culture is an interpretive enterprise rather 
than an attempt to construct an explanatory concept. The uneasy location of material and 
ideational factors in his interpretive frame tends to produce an imbalanced strategic analysis 
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in which the focus on the former is at the expense of the latter and vice versa. Poore (2003) 
also highlighted this tension, arguing that Grey ruled out the assumption that “material 
variables possess an independent causality” because they expose a discrepancy in his 
contextualist approach (p. 282). In response to the shortcomings outlined above, this study 
contends that by adopting poststructuralist discourse theory, the issue of political struggle 
over hegemony in relation to strategic culture will be accounted for. This approach also 
accommodates an analysis that harmonises material and ideational factors as shown in the 
following sections.              
In the sub-discipline of strategic culture, there is an attempt to skirt around the 
shadow of Johnston-Gray debate in order to provide the alternative conceptualisation of 
strategic culture. This alternative approach brings the attention to the critical spectrum of 
strategic culture by treating strategy as a cultural practice which establishes hegemony 
(Klein, 1988). Building on critical constructivist theory and Klein’s argument, Lock offered 
an alternative approach to strategic cultural analysis. He argued that strategic behaviour is a 
practice in which strategic culture is produced (Lock, 2010, p. 687). Lock additionally 
highlighted that strategic culture is inhabited by “a political web of interpretation in which 
strategic practices gain meaning” (ibid, p. 697). Lock’s main argument is that strategic 
culture as a practice has become meaningful because of the meanings attributed to it 
through discourses. The emphasis on the meaning-producing dimension in the study of 
strategic culture consequently facilitates a conceptual connection between material and 
ideational factors, enabling the investigation of strategic culture as “an interplay between 
practice and discourse” (Neumann & Heikka, 2005, p. 10). The conceptualisation of 
strategic culture as such is further in congruence with critical constructivist scholarships 
which pay attention to the role of national identities in actors’ interpretation of strategic 
environment (Zyla, 2015, p. 107). In this respect, identities and meanings are incorporated 
into an analysis of strategic culture. In a similar vein, in the study of Swiss strategic culture, 
Mirow (2012) argued that the socially constructed identities, on the one hand, influence 
actor’s strategic preferences. On the other hand, they construct culture (p. 344). 
21 
 
In sum, the general proposals of the constructivist strategic cultural scholars are as 
follows. First, security practices constitute a strategic culture. Second, identities and 
meanings do matter in an analysis of any strategic culture. Finally, policymakers’ 
interpretations of the world in which they live are to be taken into consideration. The study 
will take the constructivist understanding of strategic culture as a point of departure for 
further conceptual reformulation. It is contended that the constructivist’s emphasis on the 
constitutive characteristics of security practices and strategic culture is of crucial 
importance in that it opens up a possibility to trace their discursive constructions. Such 
constructions can be understood through the rubric of the poststructuralist discourse 
analysis which deals with the articulatory practices and hegemonic discourse. Moreover, 
examining the discursive aspect of strategic culture is useful because it helps to avoid the 
deterministic pitfall of positivist’s causal conception of the relationship between strategic 
culture and the ensuing response to the perceived threat.8 
In her critical re-reading of India’s nuclear strategic culture, Das (2010) suggested a 
rethinking of the approach to strategic culture. Her approach takes into account how 
discourses ascribe meanings to strategic realities and produce the underlying ideology (p. 
492). Das’s argument bespeaks a conceptual multifariousness which can be construed as 
the triad combination of critical constructivism, poststructuralism, and securitisation theory. 
In this respect, her broadened analytical approach is sufficiently flexible to capture the 
meaning-making practice within the discursive structure which, in turn, reproduces the 
identity embedded in each security practice. This study underscores that Das’s approach to 
strategic culture lays an intellectual foundation for postpositivist conception of strategic 
culture in that it provides an interpretive frame in engaging with the discursive dimension 
of states’ strategic response to the perceived threat. Within this frame, the conceptualisation 
of strategic culture as a discursive context is possible. Drawing on this insight, the study 
critically assesses states’ strategic response to the perceived threat by analysing the 
articulatory practices within which discourses and identities provide the meaning for certain 
security practices. In this respect, the issues related to an over- or underestimation of 
                                                          
8 See Lock (2010) for a critique of the deterministic understanding of strategic culture. 
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strategic realities9 and the question of the political limits of a certain strategic response can 
be more accurately tackled. In Klein’s (1988) words, through the discursive lens, “we can 
trace out the closure of political space within the trajectory of discourse and the winnowing 
down of the open” (p. 297). Simply put, the appropriate strategic response is not a given but 
it has gained meanings through the political struggle in the articulation of strategic culture. 
In a nutshell, with this poststructuralist approach, it is possible to examine the discursive 
interplay between a cluster of security practices and the privileged identity which mediates 
states’ strategic response to the perceived threat.      
PROBLEMATISING STRATEGIC CULTURE (II): RE-BORDERING THE SCOPE 
There remains a concern left marginally attended in the study of strategic culture – 
its narrow view of the notion of strategy. Most of strategic cultural scholarships are 
concentrating on the military aspect of the notion of strategy (see e.g., Klein 1991; Åselius, 
2005; Echevarria II, 2011). Put differently, it is conceptually narrowed down to the military 
matters. However, after the end of the Cold War, the international strategic environment 
has been constantly changing (Dannreuther, 2009), giving rise to the new modes of warfare. 
In the light of such “changing physiognomy of contemporary warfare” (Frunzeti, 2013), 
there is an apparent need for analytical tools which are sensitive to nonmilitary threats10 
such as Russia’s use of available media outlets to pursue its own revisionist political 
objective (Giles, 2015, p. 1). Recently, Russia has already employed information operations 
extensively as “a critical part of nonmilitary warfare” (Waltzman, 2017, pp. 3-4). It can be 
considered as a civilian avatar of military actions. Accordingly, as “hybrid warfare leads to 
a re-conceptualisation of conflict” (Mosquera & Bachmann, 2016, p. 64), the notion of 
strategy must be reframed accordingly so as to capture the hybrid characteristics of 
(non)military strategy. Besides, regarding Russia’s contemporary strategic calculation that 
the use of force is not necessarily a central feature of a certain mode of warfare (Galeotti, 
2016, p. 21), this calls for a more nuanced conceptualisation of strategy in order that it can 
                                                          
9 Toje’s (2008) conceptualisation of strategic culture has addressed this matter (p. 19). 
10 In fact, a scholarly call for taking nonmilitary threats into consideration in the post- Cold War security 
studies was made since the early 1990s by Camilleri (1994). 
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account for a plethora of situations in which the distinction not only between military and 
nonmilitary domain but also the use and non-use of force is hardly possible. Furthermore, 
looking from the disciplinary angle, strategic studies is oftentimes mistakenly regarded as 
an equivalence to the study of military affairs in the absence of a discipline of war studies 
(Barkawi, 2011, p. 704). This implies that the issues of inquiry in strategic studies can be 
diverse and are not necessarily about the use of force, war and the military.11 The scope of 
the notion of strategy can, therefore, be broadened to include the nonmilitary strategy in 
hybrid warfare. Consequently, this opens up an opportunity for the concept of strategic 
culture to break free from the preoccupation with military affairs and revitalises its 
analytical potential. Widening strategic culture agenda is, moreover, interrelated with the 
widening of the concept of security which challenges the primary emphasis on military 
threats (Huysmans, 1998, p. 227). In the light of the focus of this study, it is argued that 
Russian hybrid threat in Estonian information sphere is primarily produced by civilian 
actors rather than military operations. This requires a new mode of security thinking which 
resonates with a broader framework of strategic analysis. The empirical reality under 
investigation in this study which involves primarily in nonmilitary hybrid threats further 
demonstrates the analytical leverage of the broadened scope of the notion of strategy in 
strategic culture. The broadening agenda put forth in this study essentially encourages re-
bordering of the disciplinary scope.  
To reiterate the proposal of double-broadening agendas of strategic culture, the 
study highlights that the concept of strategic culture can be treated as a discursive 
phenomenon, thereby opening up a possibility to investigate how the hegemonic 
articulation of Estonian strategic culture defines a range of appropriate security practices in 
response to Russian hybrid threat by excluding the counter-hegemonic security practices 
from the legitimate selection of strategic response. In short, strategic culture construed as 
such generates mediating effects on states’ strategic response to the perceived threat. 
                                                          
11 Vannesson (2017) argued that critical security scholars misunderstand the concept of strategy as confined to 
the narrow domain of military and warfare. In contrast, historically, the conceptual scope of strategy has been 
broader. In other words, “strategic thinking can be used to analyse any security issue when actors interact in a 
conflicting environment” (p. 377). 
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Simultaneously, due to the new empirical challenges on the ground, the concept of strategic 
culture need be broadened in order to better capture the dynamics of strategic realities. In 
this respect, instead of focusing predominantly on the use of force and the military sector, 
the concept of strategic culture employed in this study shifts the emphasis to the 
nonmilitary security challenges.            
THE INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN DISCOURSE, IDENTITY AND STRATEGIC 
CULTURE  
In this section, the study aims at elaborating the theoretical cross-fertilisation 
between the broadened concept of strategic culture and the poststructuralist discourse 
theory. It can be understood as a poststructuralist approach to strategic culture. The study 
begins by showing the poststructuralist theorisation of identity and discourse. Both 
concepts are essential to the understanding of strategic culture as a discursive practice. All 
in all, the purpose of this theoretical discussion is to lay out how the interplays between 
discourse, identity and strategic culture enable the hegemonic articulation of strategic 
culture which, in turn, mediates states’ response to the perceived threat.        
The turn to discourse in International Relations is associated with the 
interpretive/textual study of world politics which marks a departure from the dominant 
rationalist-materialist explanation (see e.g., Doty, 1993; Weldes, J. & Saco, D., 1996; 
Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006; Der Derain, 2010). This turn is influenced by the wider 
linguistic turn in social sciences. It finds its root in the Later Wittgensteinian understanding 
of language in that language is not an independent category. Rather it is essentially context-
bound. Language and social practices are thus interlinked. Otherwise put, the rules 
governing each language game are operated in a “cultural context embedded in a form of 
life” (Jacquette, 2017). In this sense, strategic culture is governed by societal/political rules 
informed by a certain mode of language game.  
The interpretivist IR scholars – both constructivist and poststructuralist proponents 
– hold the ontological assumption that a reality is constructed rather than given. They argue 
that a reality is a part of the linguistic construction. However, whilst the conventional 
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constructivist theorisation of identity is based on the assumption that identity can be treated 
as an explanatory variable which is ultimately assumed to have an essential nature12, the 
poststructuralist argument instead asserts that identity is discursively constructed. The 
poststructuralist understanding of identity thus holds that identity is unstable, relational, and 
partially fixed within a discursive field (Laclau & Zac, 1994). In other words, there is no 
fixed and static identity. This poststructuralist’s anti-essentialist ontological position is 
reflected in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of discourse. In their words, “there is no social 
identity fully protected from a discursive exterior that deforms it and prevents becoming 
fully sutured” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001[1985]). In the context of poststructuralist discourse 
theory, each strategic culture is constructed as a part of social identity formation in that it is 
a representation of social identity in the strategic domain. Hence, the articulation of 
strategic culture simultaneously reinforces the privileged identity which is defined as the 
identity which the hegemonic discourse (re)produces. Taking this conception of identity as 
a point of departure, the study will further illuminate Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist 
theorisation of discourse.  
For poststructuralist theorists, a discourse is generally defined as “a system of 
meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects” (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 3-4). Hence, discourses provide conditions of possibility for any 
meaningful social practice (Torfing, 2003, p. 161; Weldes & Saco, 1996, pp. 372-374). 
However, this does not suggest that everything exists only in discourses. Although 
poststructuralist theorists give prime importance to discourses, they never deny the 
existence of the material world. For instance, poststructuralists would not argue that the 
anti-ballistic missiles do not exist as a material fact. However, they are instead interested in 
the meanings ascribed to those missiles which depend on discourses, i.e., they are your 
friend’s or foe’s. Hence, within the poststructuralist theoretical framework, the distinction 
between discursive and non-discursive realm is a fallacious argument. Phelan & Dahlberg 
(2013) nicely summarised that “the extra-linguistic and linguistic elements always already 
have a constituting effect on each other,” (p. 4) showing the ontological inseparability 
                                                          
12 See Wendt (1992).  
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between idea/language and material practices in the poststructuralist theorisation. 
Therefore, “all objects are objects of discourses, as their meaning depends on a socially 
constructed system of rules and significant difference” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 
3). The significant difference is another conceptual basis on which identities are formed. 
Mouffe (2000) argued that to construct “us” is to simultaneously create “them” (p. 149). 
From the theoretical viewpoint elaborated above, a strategic culture is an object of 
discourse through which it becomes socially meaningful. Besides, as the binary opposition 
of us versus them is always present in any identity construction, a strategic culture 
consequently has to exclude the “them” from the “us” components to preserve its existence.        
What remains unexplained here is how meanings are actually produced within the 
discourses. It is necessary to introduce two basic categories, namely elements and 
moments. Both concepts are specific to Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptualisation. Elements 
can be understood as signs which are not being articulated whereas moments are signs with 
a meaning that are already articulated into and partly fixed within a discursive chain 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001[1985], pp. 105-113). For Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985]), the 
articulation is defined as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that 
their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (p. 105). Additionally, 
there are floating signifiers within a discourse which stay open for diverse meanings 
(Bergström, Ekström & Boréus, 2017, p. 214). This study particularly interests in the 
floating signifier “Western democracy” which is central to Estonia’s strategic culture. What 
enable elements to become moments are nodal points which are “privileged signifiers that 
fix the meaning of a signifying chain” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001[1985], p. 112). These nodal 
points contribute to the emergence of hegemonic discourse. The hegemonic discourse 
embodies partially fixed meanings and identities produced at a particular moment in time 
and sustains a contingent decidability within the undecidable system of signs (Mole, 2012, 
p. 14). 
Looking at discourses in a more concrete slant, Laclau and Mouffe introduced two 
logics which facilitate discursive analysis, namely the logic of equivalence and the logic of 
difference. The logic of equivalence refers to the merging of signs with different meanings 
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and unassociated identities in order to form a new meaning (Bergström, Ekström & Boréus, 
2017, pp. 215-218). In contrast, the logic of difference corresponds to a discursive practice 
of dissipating the chain of equivalence. Social identities emerge out of the interactions 
between the two logics. Such an interaction is determined by political struggles (Torfing, 
2003, p. 162). However, not all available meanings are ascribed to the moments in each 
discourse. Those extra meanings can be located in the field of discursivity which is “the 
field of irreducible surplus meaning” (ibid., p. 163). From this theoretical perspective, the 
hegemonic articulation of strategic culture thus gives meanings to the semantic categories 
used in the strategic narratives such as “hybrid threat”, “an appropriate strategic option”, 
and “normal strategic response”. These categories are manifested through security practices 
such as non-banning of television broadcast or the establishment of official propaganda-
debunking team. Besides, the hegemonic articulation of strategic culture is partially fixed 
by the nodal points, namely “liberalism”, “the West”, “democracy” and “multiculturalism”. 
These nodal points resonate with the privileged identity which provides legitimacy for the 
hegemonic position of a certain mode of strategic culture.       
Furthermore, the discursively constructed identity informs subject position. A 
subject cannot be conceived of as a subject of totality or completeness (Žižek, 1994). To 
quote Laclau (2006), “The presence of the antagonistic other prevents me from fully being 
myself” (p. 106). Antagonism, according to Laclau and Mouffe (2001[1985], pp. 122-127) 
can be summarised as the linguistic disruption within the discursive system, contributing to 
the dislocation of hegemonic discourse. Such a dislocation “induces identity crisis for a 
subject” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 13). The constant dislocations within the 
discursive structure thereby produce “a subject that always emerges as a split subject” 
(Torfing, 2003, p. 165). Consequently, when dislocation occurs, the identity of the subject 
will also be threatened and the subject will be compelled to reassert its subjectivity 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 13). The incompleteness of the subject reflects that “the 
subjectivity of the agent is penetrated by the same precariousness and absence of suture 
apparent at any other point of the discursive totality of which it is part” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001 [1985], p.121). Consequently, the subject will identify itself with the hegemonic 
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discourse which, in turn, confers a certain identity on them (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, 
pp. 13-14).  
Likewise, the hegemonic strategic culture is not an ontologically complete entity. 
As extra-meanings are always available in the field of discursivity, it is possible that the 
counter-hegemonic strategic culture (antagonism) can emerge and lead to the dislocation of 
the hegemonic articulation of strategic culture. However, owing to the inescapability from 
being constantly dislocated, the hegemonic strategic culture will reproduce the privileged 
identity to secure itself. This identity is superimposed on the range of possible strategic 
response and provides legitimacy for the corresponding security practices. By the same 
token, each security practice in response to the perceived threat serves as a site within 
which the privileged identity is (re)produced. 
To recapitulate, the anti-essentialist poststructuralist reading of strategic culture 
highlights that strategic culture is not given but discursively constructed. Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed that there is a prior strategic culture. Instead, it is contingent and 
constantly contested (Strömbom, 2012, p. 172; Bucher & Jasper, 2016, pp. 393-395). 
Furthermore, as there is no distinction between an extra-discursive and a discursive realm, 
discourses serve as a nexus between an interpretation and an action. Simply put, discourses 
make security practices meaningful by conferring not merely meanings but also identity on 
them. As “political struggles are key to the emergence of hegemonic discourse” (Mole, 
2012, p. 14), the hegemonic articulation of strategic culture needs politico-cultural 
legitimacy to render certain security practices it justifies appropriate and “normal”.13 One 
way of doing so is to exclude the challenging signs underpinned by antagonistic political 
forces from the hegemonic articulation. Nevertheless, as the “antagonistic Other” is always 
needed in the process of identity construction (Herschinger, 2012), constant othering of 
antagonistic categories is always a part of the articulation of strategic culture. The 
hegemonic strategic culture is thus compelled to defend the privileged identity with which 
it identifies so as to maintain its dominant status. Through these discursive dynamics, 
                                                          
13 In their study of NATO’s operations in Darfur, Pomarède & Schjødt (2015) argued that discourses make 
certain politico-military practices appear “normal” and legitimate.    
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security practices containing the elements of antagonistic Other will be either marginalised 
or filtered out. Simply put, a strategic response carrying antagonistic connotations is 
labelled as an inappropriate response.   
Building on the theoretical intersections between discourse, identity and strategic 
culture, this study proposes that security practice is defined as the total sum of political, 
security and historical discourse which provides a cognitive frame for the evaluation of and 
in response to the perceived threat. The security practices gaining a hegemonic status 
through political struggles are subsequently consolidated within the contour of the 
hegemonic strategic culture. Therefore, both are mutually constitutive. The hegemonic 
articulation of strategic culture is sustained by certain nodal points embedded within the 
security practices. Through this consolidating and constituting process, a certain floating 
signifier becomes established as a privileged identity. In the light of this theorisation, the 
hegemonic articulation of strategic culture mediates states’ strategic response to the 
perceived threat in the manner that it filters out security practices which challenge the 
hegemonic strategic culture whilst rendering certain security practices as appropriate and 
“normal”. As contingency and non-essentialisation of an entity are inherent characteristics 
of poststructuralist discourse theory, there is always a room for the restructuring of a 
discursive system, rendering strategic culture susceptible to constant dislocations. The 
theoretical implication on this study is that strategic culture needs to be constantly 
reproduced through the practice of strategic response. Therefore, the privileged identity 
embedded in the strategic culture is also present in each strategic response.  
All in all, through the poststructuralist approach developed in this chapter, the study 
can better capture how the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture mediates the 
country’s response to Russian hybrid threat in its information sphere. What is more, 
unpacking the discursive formation and disposition of Estonia’s strategic culture further 
sheds light on the likelihood of strategic response to such a threat. In the final section of 
this chapter, the study lays out the articulation of Russian hybrid threat through Estonian 
discourses.  
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THE ARTICULATION OF RUSSIAN HYBRID THREAT IN ESTONIAN 
DISCOURSES 
This section is devoted to the discussion on how the concept of Russian hybrid 
threat is understood in the Estonian context. The conception of strategic culture as a 
discursive context demonstrated above necessitates a reappraisal of the notion of Russian 
hybrid threat. In other words, it must also be based on the poststructuralist theoretical 
ground. The main argument of this section is that Russian hybrid threat is not an objective 
phenomenon but is produced by discourses.  
The traditional conception of threat in strategic culture literature is generally based 
on the essentialising of threat (see e.g., Minkina, 2011; Búzás, 2013, p. 579). This reflects 
an assumption that threats have a stable ontology and thus can be objectively identified. 
However, from a poststructuralist theoretical perspective, Russian hybrid threat is a 
semantic category which does not have an essential feature, but it depends on meanings 
ascribed to it by the articulation of certain discourses. Otherwise put, the existence of 
Russian hybrid threat as a given is impossible (see Brown, 1994, pp. 222-227). Although it 
is beyond the scope of this study to delve further into the discursive construction of Russian 
hybrid threat, for the sake of analytical precision it is worth mapping out the representation 
of Russian hybrid threat in Estonian public discourses. This intellectual enterprise is 
necessary because it provides a sense of what Russian hybrid threat refers to in this study. It 
also responds to the literature criticising that the concept of hybrid threat is devoid of 
analytical significance (See Renz & Smith, 2016, p. 1; Renz, 2016). This line of reproval is, 
too, present in Estonian discourse (Tagel, 2015).  
Turning to the discussion on Russian hybrid threat in the western policy and 
academic texts, the concept is generally referred to as a strategy that employs both military 
and nonmilitary methods in conflicts, keeps the military operations below the full-scale war 
threshold, creates vulnerabilities from within through subtle manipulation of a civilian 
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population, and makes the strategic response imprecise.14 These definitions point to the 
nonmilitary and unconventional features of Russian hybrid warfare. Taking this as a point 
of departure, the intertextual analysis exhibits that the notion of Russian hybrid threat has 
become articulated shortly after Russia’s operations in the conflicts in eastern Ukraine and 
Crimea in 2014 in which a wide array of military and nonmilitary strategies was employed. 
Despite echoing the Western usage of the term “Russian hybrid threat”, the localised 
conception of this term in Estonian public discourses reveals four specific representations.  
In 2014 Estonian Defence Forces’ year book, Rosin delineated the characteristics of 
Russian hybrid operations, noting that “in the 21st century military operations rely 
considerably on nonmilitary measures to achieve political goals” (p. 33). Estonian security 
expert Henrik Praks also shared a similar understanding of Russian hybrid threat. For him, 
the nonmilitary threats stemmed from the strategy of hybrid warfare can potentially lead to 
the destabilisation of Estonian society (Praks, 2017). Accordingly, the nonmilitary aspect of 
Russian hybrid threat is accentuated. For Estonia, an emphasis is additionally placed on the 
potential hybrid threat in its cyberspace. (Hunter & Pernik, 2015) Moreover, Teperik 
(2018) linked the informational-psychological influence through disinformation with the 
category “Russian hybrid threat”. Clarifying the characteristics of Russia’s strategy in 
contemporary warfare, Arold (2016) suggested that hybrid threat should be construed 
through Russia’s military term “information operation” which is associated with Putin’s 
regime. Estonian academic Vladimir Sazonov further pointed out that the presence of 
Russian media in Estonia’s information sphere makes Estonia particularly susceptible to 
Russia (Kaukvere, 2016a). Estonian National Defence College had also developed 
scenarios and training in response to the potential informational threats from Russia 
                                                          
14 Mansoor (2012) on the combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (p. 2); Cȋrdei (2015) on 
the avoidance of an open and direct confrontation (p. 114); Bachmann & Gunneriusson (2015) and Waltzman 
(2017) on the combination of new technology and information in warfare; Major & Mölling (2015) and 
Schaub Jr., Murphy & Hoffman (2017) on the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the target countries; 
Raitasalo (2017), Erol & Oǧuz (2015), and Munteanu (2015) on the influencing public opinion and 
destabilising internal cohesion; and Deep (2015) and Stavridis (2016) on the creation of confusion and grey 
zones in which military response can be indecisive.    
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(Kaukvere, 2016b). Drawing on the discussion on Russian hybrid threat in Estonian public 
discourses presented above, the following four main representations of such a threat 
articulated through Estonian public discourses are spelt out. First, Russian hybrid threat is 
associated with the nonmilitary measure in warfare whilst the conventional military aspect 
remains prominent. In other words, Estonian understanding of hybrid warfare is twofold in 
the sense that military aspect must always be present pari passu with nonmilitary measures. 
Therefore, although the study focuses on Estonia’s strategic response to the nonmilitary 
aspect of Russian hybrid threat, it does not suggest that the military angle is disappearing 
from the strategic calculation. Figure 1 helps to illustrate the overarching intellectual model 
of Estonian understanding of Russian hybrid threat. Additionally, the figure also displays 
the boundary of Estonian information sphere understood in this study. It must be clarified 
that this figure is an analytical construct which is meant to facilitate a precise conceptual 
communication. Hence, its aim is not to essentialise the concept.  
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Figure 1: Estonian understanding of Russian hybrid threat 
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available media outlets 
 
 
 
Second, the informational-psychological influence is considered to be an integral part of the 
strategy of hybrid warfare. Thus, from Estonian point of view, Russia’s media outlets are 
understood within the framework of Russian hybrid war strategy. Third, Russian hybrid 
threat can potentially destabilise societal cohesion. Taking the case of Estonia into 
consideration, a significant gap in the perception of Russian threat between Estonian- and 
Russian-speaking population raises the problems about the political trust in the state and the 
cohesion of the society (Mattiisen, 2017). Therefore, Russia’s disinformation and 
propaganda campaigns are playing with the “truth” and “trust” in Estonia’s information 
sphere in the sense that multiple truths are presented to confuse the public and undermine 
                                                          
15 Contemporary Russian public diplomacy is characterised by the combination of “propaganda, cultural 
diplomacy and political influence techniques” (Saari, 2015, p. 61). Moreover, Russia’s Compatriot Policy 
launched in 2006 also involves in the use of media to spread propaganda to influence Russian-speaking 
population abroad (Kudors, 2015).   
16 Major & von Voss (2016) argued that economic blackmail/coercion can be combined with other military 
means to destabilise a target state (p. 2).  
Information sphere 
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political trust in the government (Bittman, 1985, p. 49; Schultz & Godson, 1984, Wilson, 
2005, pp. 8-9, 33; Estonian Encyclopaedia, 2006). The truth-trust strategy in Russian 
hybrid threat can be summarised in the words of Besemeres (2016) as “a semi-truthful 
narrative with big lies in its strategic points” (p. 356). In case of Estonia, major Russian 
propaganda revolves around the recurrent trope of the legitimacy of Soviet rule over 
Estonia (and other Baltic states), the oppression of Russian minority, “anti-NATO rhetoric” 
(Mattiisen, 2017), and Nazi-sympathetic mentality amongst the Estonians (Kiviräkh, 2010, 
p. 61). The circulation of such narratives through Russian media outlets in Estonia has 
become articulated as a threat precisely because it can alter the public perception of certain 
events, induces confusion (Priimägi, 2015, p. 48) and undermines the country’s overall 
security (Radin, 2017, p. 18). Fourth, the concept of propaganda and disinformation can be 
located in the equivalential relationship. They are articulated into the common frame of 
Russian hybrid threat. Accordingly, this study does not distinguish between disinformation 
and propaganda and uses the terms interchangeably. To conclude, the key argument made 
in this section is that Russian hybrid threat is discursively constructed and imprinted in the 
four representations outlined above. 
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CHAPTER II 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the study’s methodology. It starts with the research design, 
followed by the selection of texts. The method of analysis section lays out the logical 
sequences in the application of the poststructuralist intertextual analysis on the research. 
The analysis is performed on the corpus of strategic texts in order to identify the nodal 
points sustaining Estonia’s strategic culture and security practices. The study further 
elaborates how the discursive context sews discursive elements together.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is a qualitative single-case study of a deviant case. The deviant case 
analysis aims at revealing “the limits of extant theory” (Wicks, 2010, p. 291; see also 
Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 176). With regard to this study, researching the case of Estonia 
points to the limit of IR realist’s balance of threat theory whose theoretical prediction does 
not adequately capture Estonia’s strategic behaviour in managing Russian hybrid threats in 
its information sphere. The empirical case study is Estonian strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat in the information sphere after Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
Accordingly, the temporal (2014-2018) and spatial context (Estonia) define the boundary of 
the case.   
Drawing on the pioneering work of Laclau & Mouffe (2001[1985]) and Hansen 
(2006), poststructuralist discourse analysis is employed as a method of analysis. 
Approaching Estonia’s strategic response to Russia’s hybrid threat in its information sphere 
through the rubric of poststructuralist discourse theory needs an interpretive frame which is 
sensitive to the interplays between different discursive components. In response to this 
challenge, the study revisits the ideational factors that “the traditional rationalist-materialist 
theoretical models of strategic decision-making overlook” (Bloomfield, 2012, p. 437), 
namely political culture, national identity and historical experience. It subsequently situates 
the three notions in the contour of poststructuralist discourse theory. Within this 
framework, they become understood as basic discourses which highlight “the points of 
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contestation within a debate” (Hansen, 2006, p. 52). As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, discourses are sustained by nodal points. Accordingly, the study analyses political 
culture, national identity and historical experience discourse along the axis of their nodal 
points in order to identify the discursive link between security practices, identity and 
strategic culture. With this scheme of analysis, it is possible to sketch a range of 
perceivable strategic response to Russian hybrid threats.   
In order to examine the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture, the 
study relies on a corpus of strategic texts and transcribed texts from six interviews as its 
main sources. Reading intertextually, these texts present the debates on how Estonia should 
appropriately respond to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. The selected texts 
used in this study also contain strategic narratives. It is worth underscoring that these texts 
are just the “vehicle for understanding” (Dunn and Neumann, 2016, p. 2) but they are not 
the discourses themselves. Regarding the interview, six additional semi-structured elite 
interviews with Estonian officials and security experts were conducted. The aim of the 
interviews is twofold. First, the interviews help to deepen the analysis of how Estonia’s 
hegemonic strategic culture is articulated amongst the practitioners who (re)produce the 
discourse containing what is understood to be appropriate strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat. Second, the interviews compensate my limited access to the classified 
documents.  
This study, however, has three major limitations. First, this study is selective in that 
it excludes relevant books written in Estonian due to my limited knowledge of the 
language. It instead relies extensively on news articles in both English and Estonian and 
English translation of official documents. However, whilst this may limit the depth of the 
study, the sample is still sufficient to identify main traits of Estonia’s strategic culture in 
response to Russian hybrid threat. Second, although this study does not aim at formulating 
a causal explanation, it remains liable to equifinality since many other factors may be in 
play such as a lack of resources, institutional constraints, or Europeanisation. Third, the 
accessibility of information has been a challenge in security and defence studies (Walt, 
1991, pp. 227-228). Restrictions on access to certain information unavoidably limit the 
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depth of my analysis. Nonetheless, the absence of such classified resources does not 
undermine the intellectual enterprise this study pursues seeing that the hegemonic 
articulation of Estonian strategic culture is not only confined to those classified documents.  
As regards the selection of case, Estonia is chosen due to its deviancy from the 
realist’s theoretical expectations. It deviates in the sense that given its size, geo-strategic 
location, the degree of digitalisation, the presence of sizeable Russian ethnic minority, it 
can be expected to adhere to realist expectations. But when it comes to the information 
sphere, Estonia exhibits the following deviations. First, Estonia, albeit being a member of 
NATO, remains vulnerable to Russian hybrid threat because of its sizeable Russian-
speaking population who are not fully integrated into Estonian society (Włodarska-
Frykowska, 2016) and “live in a separate information space” (Bulakh et al., 2014). The 
study adopts the definition of Russian-speaking population as defined by Schulze (2010) 
which is “those members of the minority community who declare Russian as their mother 
tongue or as their second language” (p. 363). Although Latvia is intimately similar in this 
respect, Schulze (2009) argued that “Latvian elites questioned the loyalty of segments of 
the Russian-speaking minority more than Estonian elites did” (p. 7). This marks a 
significant qualitative difference between Estonia and Latvia. Moreover, in 2007, Russia 
launched cyberattacks against Estonia in response to the decision to move the memorial 
commemorating Soviet soldiers from a square in Tallinn. The ensuing riots by ethnic 
Russian were largely a result of Russian instigation through disinformation (Lucas & 
Pomeranzev, 2016). Estonia is thus susceptible to Russian (informational-psychological) 
hybrid threat. It is, however, of crucial importance not to overstate the impact of Russia’s 
disinformation campaigns because there is no irredentist inclination amongst Estonia’s 
Russian-speaking population (Petsinis, 2016). They are diverse along the spectrum from 
pro-Kremlin to pro-Estonia (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015).   
Second, despite being exposed to Russian hybrid threat especially in the form of 
disinformation and propaganda, Estonia remains committed to the liberal principle of 
freedom of speech. Whilst Latvia and Lithuania temporarily banned Russian media outlets 
such as Sputnik News and Ren TV Baltic in response to Russia’s disinformation 
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campaigns, Estonia decided not to block those Russian broadcasts (EUACTIV, 2016; 
Gathman, 2017). From a regional perspective, the three Baltic states respond to Russian 
hybrid threat in their information spheres differently, despite their shared hostility towards 
Russia. Lithuania is considered to be the most responsive towards Russian aggression and 
most vocal in criticising Russia. For instance, Lithuanian defence ministry published in 
2014 a manual entitled “How to Act in Extreme Situations or Instances of War.” The 
manual also outlines scenarios of foreign invasion (Kuncina & Sindelar, 2015). In case of 
Latvia, the separatism-related image appearing on Facebook of Vladimir Linderman – a 
pro-Russian activist – did alarm Latvian authority, leading to an inquiry by security 
services (Rettman, 2015). This exhibits a serious anxiety amongst the Latvian authorities 
which results in the implementation of more restrictive measures against Russian threats 
vis-à-vis Estonia. In this regard, all Baltic states face a similar threat but Estonia responds 
differently. Put simply, although Estonia would be most likely to respond assertively as the 
realists would expect, it does not. This deviancy suggests that a domestic factor (e.g. 
strategic culture) is expected to be at work.  
Third, website blocking or cyber surveillance are effective measures in tackling 
Russia’s disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Implementing such expedients will 
infringe on the principle of freedom of speech, however. In case of Estonia, the country is 
ranked amongst the highest with regard to Internet freedom (Crosby, 2017), showing that 
the flow of information is unencumbered, albeit risk of disinformation and 
propaganda. This once again insinuates that Estonia’s liberal strategic culture may mediate 
its strategic response.  
Fourth, Estonia is considered to be one of the world’s most wired country 
(Campbell, 2017). Public services in Estonia depend immensely on the uninterrupted 
functioning of the country’s information technology (IT) system. This obviously, from a 
defence perspective, brings about a great deal of disquietude that the country’s IT 
infrastructure will be targeted by external threats. In case of Estonia, in spite of the threats 
from politically motivated cyberattacks (RIA, 2015), the balance between security and civil 
liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, privacy, media pluralism) has been well proportioned. 
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Strictures – such as cyber surveillance – imposed on the citizens are limited (personal 
communication, 2018, February 6). In contrast, Estonia clearly focuses on enhancing cyber 
hygiene which is essentially an empowerment of individual cyberspace users. (personal 
communication, 2018, January 22) This again hints at the liberal undertone which is 
expected to play a crucial role in mediating the country’s strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat.         
It is nonetheless important to re-emphasise that Estonian national defence policies 
still stress the building up of the conventional defence capabilities inasmuch as the 
conventional warfare is concerned (Salu & Männik, 2013). This undoubtedly reflects a 
realist posture. It is inaccurate to argue that realist inclination does not present itself in 
Estonian strategic culture. However, in relation to Russian hybrid threat in Estonia’s 
information sphere, “domestic variables such as culture may have a more independent 
impact” (Desch, 1998, p. 166). Therefore, this leads to the adoption of strategic culture as a 
conceptual framework for this study. The assumption is that augmenting military 
capabilities in response to the increasing threat (balance of threat) may not be the only logic 
that Estonia adopts in formulating its defence strategies and security policies.   
SELECTION OF TEXTS 
In order to compile the corpus of Estonia’s strategic texts, the first task is to develop 
a guideline of textual selections. In this study, three criteria are established as follows. First, 
strategic texts must contain strategic narratives in the sense that the discussions on strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat must be present. Second, strategic texts must be of 
Estonian origin. This facilitates a context-bound genealogical reading of power relations 
underlying Estonian strategic culture (Gutting, 1990). Third, strategic texts should 
correspond with the time frame of the study (Hansen, 2006, p. 82). Therefore, the majority 
of the texts in this study were authored between 2014 and 2018. The second task is to 
identify a set of relevant texts which forms an intertextual web (Hansen, 2016, pp. 73-92). 
The intertextual reading of the text is useful because it foregrounds the “social framework 
regulating textual production within a discourse community” (Porter, 1986, pp. 38-39). 
Drawing on this insight, the study particularly focuses on the texts produced by Estonian 
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official strategic planning community – namely Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Government and President Office of Estonia and Estonian Defence Forces – as a 
point of departure. The texts produced by those organisations – namely official government 
policies, press release, and official speeches – cluster around the core of the intertextual 
web of strategic texts. Shapiro (1990) further pointed out that the major function of official 
discourse is to “strategically affect the interpretation of policy structures, ideals and 
implementation” (p. 334). Hence, analysing such discourses helps to trace the political 
legitimacy underlying certain security practices that are deemed as appropriate and 
“normal” strategic options. The next group of texts is Estonian expert’s analysis and 
Estonian official’s published opinion. The last series of strategic texts is the journalistic 
reports and other relevant articles which convey explicit quotes of Estonian officials on the 
one hand and texts reflecting public debate, on the other. In short, the relevancy of textual 
sources is justified inasmuch as the text reflects Estonia’s “strategic narratives”17 regarding 
Russian hybrid threat in the country’s information sphere. Finally, this study intentionally 
presents direct quotations from selected strategic texts in order to show the relevant nodal 
points and how the study interprets them. Sixty-seven strategic texts are included in the 
analysis.18 
Furthermore, a supplementary tool added to this study’s methodology is the 
interview which primarily helps to identify the (in)consistency of the hegemonic 
articulation of Estonia’s strategic culture by policymakers. The interview data are 
interpreted in line with the study’s poststructuralist theoretical frame in that each interview 
is transcribed and treated as one of the textual sources. Additionally, the study looks for 
“the linkage between interviewees’ subject position with the wider discursive articulations” 
(Wetherell, 1998, p. 401). This facilitates a location of the transcribed texts within the 
intertextual web of strategic texts.  
 
 
                                                          
17 See Becker & Malesky (2017) for the detailed discussion on the characteristics of strategic texts.  
18 See appendix 1.  
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METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
In conducting a concrete analysis utilising poststructuralist discourse analysis 
method, clear markers of enunciated and discursively articulated signs are of supreme 
importance since the interactions between those signs are fundamental to the hegemonic 
articulation of Estonia’s strategic culture. The first step in analysing the strategic texts is to 
spell out three signs which are necessary in the construction of privileged identity, namely 
“element (a sign that is under contention), moment (an element with partially fixed 
meaning) and floating signifier (a highly contested element remaining open to different 
meanings)” (Bergström, Ekström & Boréus, 2017, pp. 217-218). The three signs interact in 
“the process of linking and differentiation” (Hansen, 2006) which is underpinned by 
political struggles. Stated differently, through this process, certain signs are linked together 
and form a privileged identity. Identifying the privileged identity is a point of departure for 
detecting other essential semantic categories which are linked, marginalised and juxtaposed 
in the debates on the strategic response. However, such a process is not linear but 
constantly disrupted and contested. The task here is to capture the dynamic interactions 
between signs in the process of linking and differentiating. In order to do so, the study 
proposes that in the second step, an investigation of the political impacts of such a process 
must be conducted in accordance with the logic of interpretation. In his historical appraisal 
of American foreign policy, Campbell (1998) introduced the logic of interpretation as an 
analytic frame which deals with “the political effects of prioritising one mode of 
representation over another” (p. 4). The logic of interpretation highlights a rank of some 
statements and representations within a value-grading hierarchy which can be 
conceptualised as a discursive economy (ibid., pp. 6-7). Otherwise put, some discourses 
have the privilege over others. Hence, discursive economy explicates the relationships 
between different discourses. The concept of discursive economy, moreover, helps to trace 
the traits of political legitimacy of certain security practices which are seen as appropriate 
and “normal” response. In short, certain discourses which (re)produce the privileged 
identity have gained greater value than others and become the legitimate point of reference 
for Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat.     
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The third step is to expound on to what extent other competing discourses are in 
play. This is crucial because the hegemonic discourse can be dislocated by the counter-
hegemonic discourses underpinned by antagonistic political forces. When analysing texts, 
the dislocation can be specified within the chain of difference which disrupts the 
hegemonic articulation. Exclusions and negations are displayed when the hegemonic 
discourses are dislocated (Howarth, 2010, p. 312). In this respect, the challenging signs 
must be singled out too. Engaging with competing discourses, moreover, helps to make 
clear the boundary of the hegemonic discourse which articulates Estonia’s hegemonic 
strategic culture. As argued in the previous chapter, the privileged identity is constructed on 
the binary opposition of the Self and Other as “others are always already involved in our 
identity” (Wæver, 1996, p. 127, original emphasis). The hegemonic strategic culture has to 
repeatedly assert the privileged identity with which it identifies. This demonstrates that the 
contingent hegemonic strategic discourse is constantly struggling to withstand the 
challenging antagonistic forces. The hegemonic strategic discourse consequently tries to 
exclude the antagonistic signs from gaining hegemony. The legitimisation of the existing 
Estonian security practices, therefore, keeps the antagonistic forces out of the terrain of 
political legitimacy.     
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CHAPTER III 
THE HEGEMONIC ARTICULATION OF ESTONIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
AND THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN HYBRID 
THREAT 
Drawing on the theoretical and methodological discussions in the previous chapters, 
this chapter turns to a concrete analysis of the hegemonic articulation of Estonia’s strategic 
culture and its mediating effects which render certain security practices in response to 
Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere appropriate and “normal”. In particular, it 
directs the attention towards the political debates about the appropriate strategic response to 
Russian hybrid threat in Estonia’s information sphere.  
As this study focuses on the discourses underpinning three aspects of strategic 
culture, namely political culture, national identity and historical experience discourse, it has 
identified the nodal points sustaining such discourses. The objective of this enterprise is to 
explicate the corresponding relationship between nodal points, the privileged identity and 
the type of discourse by following the methods outlined in the previous chapter. The nodal 
points serve as the markers informing which relevant signs can be linked with or 
differentiated from which discourse. Three clusters of main nodal points are singled out as 
follows:  
(A) The hegemonic political culture discourse is sustained by the nodal point 
“media liberalism,” referencing the privileged identity “Western democracy”. 
(B) The hegemonic historical experience discourse is sustained by the nodal point 
“normal unpeace,” referencing the privileged identity “anti-Soviet/non-
Russia”.   
(C) The counter-hegemonic national identity discourse is sustained by the nodal 
point “media sovereignty,” referencing the privileged identity “Estonian 
singularity”.  
Two types of hegemonic discourses underlying Estonia’s strategic culture are thus 
identified, namely political culture and historical experience discourse. The interplays 
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between the hegemonic political culture and historical experience discourse consequently 
define Estonia’s political frontier19 which enables (or restrains) a certain strategic response 
and appropriate security practices. The national identity discourse is specified as the 
counter-hegemonic discourse. Drawing on the privileged identity, the hegemonic 
articulations of political culture and historical experience discourse ascribe the quality of 
appropriateness to certain security practices whilst delegitimising others carrying 
antagonistic signs. The antagonistic signs need be singled out because they enable the 
hegemonic strategic culture to distinguish itself from the significant Other. The study will 
further demonstrate that security practices are consolidated within and simultaneously 
reproduce Estonia’s hegemonic strategic culture. Simultaneously, the counter-hegemonic 
forces challenging the dominant strategic culture are presented through the national identity 
discourse. Such forces are trying to dislocate Estonia’s minimalist strategic culture and are 
thus excluded from the hegemonic articulations. Figure 2 illustrates the argument made in 
this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 The extent to which strategic response can be politically legitimately perceived.  
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Figure 2: Summary of the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture in 
countering Russian hybrid threat 
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 In what follows, the study elaborates on Estonia’s hegemonic political culture 
discourse, the counter-hegemonic national identity discourse and the hegemonic historical 
experience discourse respectively. Subsequently, it illustrates how the interplays between 
the two hegemonic discourses enable each security practice to become appropriate strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat. The study argues that the mutual gravitation between the 
hegemonic political culture and historical experience discourse creates conditions of 
possibility for the minimalist orientation of Estonia’s strategic culture. The study also 
accentuates the counter-hegemonic forces at work. The strategic texts are analysed along 
the axis of the above-outlined nodal points. Through these logical sequences, the mediating 
effects of the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture on Estonia’s strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere are disclosed. 
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POLITICAL CULTURE DISCOURSE: MEDIA LIBERALISM  
Media liberalism has long been celebrated in Estonia. Harro-Loit & Loit (2014) 
argued that since the 1990s, Estonia’s media policies have been characterised by a liberal 
approach. Moreover, from a historical perspective, they highlighted that “Estonian news 
media formed part of the nation’s cultural resistance against the Soviet ideology” (ibid., p. 
214). This liberal media tradition has been constantly reproduced through a number of non-
restrictive institutional arrangements in Estonia’s information sphere. For instance, Estonia 
has been enforcing minimal media regulations and media laws in place are limited (Loit & 
Siibak, 2013). Locating Estonia’s media liberalism in the wider context of democratic 
transition, the liberal media tradition has formed an equivalential link with the privileged 
identity of Western democracy. In Estonia, it can be said that democracy is amongst the 
notions ranked at the top of the country’s political lexicon. Mälksoo (2013) pointed out 
that, presenting itself in contrast to Russian version of democracy, Estonia has attempted to 
be “an exemplary part of the Western democratic tradition” (p. 158). Estonia’s strong 
Western democratic identity is underpinned by the “Return to Europe” discourse in the 
context of the re-independence and the successive integration into the EU and NATO. This 
particular discourse establishes an equivalential relation between Estonia and Europe (Berg, 
2002, p. 118; Feldman, 2001; Aalto & Berg, 2002, p. 261). Put differently, “Estonia is 
writing itself into the western democratic tradition” (Michaels & Stevick, 2009, pp. 242-
243). The Western democratic identity has thus become defined as one of the major sources 
of political legitimacy in structuring Estonia’s politico-security practices. As regards the 
country’s information sphere, Estonian media landscape had become very close to the 
West’s since the first decade of re-independence (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2002). This 
suggests a liberal predisposition of Estonia’s political and media culture. In short, it can be 
argued that the widely articulated Estonian political culture is marked by its Western 
democratic culture. This further underpins Estonia’s liberal media tradition. However, 
being a floating signifier, the concept of democracy has also been used differently in 
domestic political struggles especially when it comes to the issue of Russian speaking 
minority. Saarts (2012) described two models of Estonian democracy. One is based on the 
47 
 
concept of ethnocentrist democratic model which subscribes to the idea that national 
community is built on the titular ethnic group. The other can be conceptualised as the 
multiculturalist democratic model, embracing the idea that citizenship is a foundation of a 
nation. The latter provides a ground for the discursive connection between the notion of 
media liberalism with multiculturalism as the following discussion about the purchase of 
Pervõi Baltiski Channel (PBK) programmes by Tallinn Television (TTV) will demonstrate. 
Simply put, different conceptualisations of democracy play out in the debate over Estonia’s 
strategic solution to Russian hybrid threat. It should also be reminded that Estonian version 
of ethno-nationalism is a moderate one. Although it is apparent that Estonia’s national 
political landscape is overwhelmingly represented by the titular population, the local level 
remains relatively open for Russophone speakers to have a share (Cianetti, 2014). 
Moreover, debatably, the Europeanisation process further moderates the nationalist party’s 
(e.g., the Pro Patria Union) radical agendas (Bennich-Björkman & Magnus, 2012), thereby 
allowing a moderate political trajectory to prevail. This partly contributes to the 
minimalisation of nationalists’ pressure on Russian media operating in Estonia. 
Furthermore, through a postcolonial lens, Peiker (2016) argued that constitutional narrative 
of nationhood helps to sustain Estonia’s liberal democracy (p. 120). Knitting this argument 
into the focus of this study, it can be said that another important trait of Estonian political 
culture is law-based politics. Therefore, the constitution-oriented political culture further 
guarantees the protection of media liberalism (see Loit & Harro-Loit, 2016). In sum, 
Estonia’s hegemonic political culture discourse is sustained by the concept of media 
liberalism underpinned by the Western democratic identity. The study will show that this 
concept is translated into Estonia’s strategic texts and legitimises the existing minimal 
security practices.   
NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSE: MEDIA SOVEREIGNTY 
Estonia’s national identity discourse has produced antagonistic forces against the 
hegemonic political culture discourse. The national identity discourse has constructed a 
binary opposition in which the sign “Soviet/Russia” is the significant Other of the sign 
“Estonia”. Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä (2008) nicely summarised that “Russia has remained 
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the threatening Other against which all elements of Estonian national drama are contested” 
(p. 406). They also pointed out that there is a “collective amnesia in Estonian society” in 
that the interpretation of Estonian history under the Soviet rule is entirely about traumatic 
suffering (ibid., p. 407). Therefore, after the re-independence, Estonia had initiated the 
nation-building process which emphasises the privileged right of the titular population 
(Hogan-Brun & Wright, 2013, p. 245). This presents a monist view of identity according to 
which Estonian identity is the only fundamental component of national identity. It can be 
conceptualised as “Estonian singularity”. It is precisely this idea on which the concept of 
media sovereignty draws. It thus serves as the privileged identity legitimising the national 
identity discourse. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not unique to Estonia as it can be 
found in other multiethnic post-communist states (Zaslavsky, 1992). In the early years of 
transition, Estonia had adopted the nationalising trajectory of nation-building (Cheskin, 
2015, p. 85) which is based on the idea of the ethnocultural singularity of Estonian-ness. 
The event of Estonian Song Festival (Laulupidu) – where such ethno-cultural discourses are 
reproduced – is illustrative of this idea (Pawłusz, 2017, p. 253; Raudsepp & Vikat, 2011). 
Built on the idea of Estonian singularity, the national identity discourse has created 
uneasiness amongst the Russophone population. This led them to develop “their own 
discourse of victimhood” (Hogan-Brun & Wright, 2013, p. 245), narrating the 
marginalisation they encounter due to the restrictive citizenship law. Thus, the national 
identity discourse projects the sign “Russian speakers” into the chain of difference. 
Moreover, this “victimhood” discourse is used by Russia who keeps (re)producing the 
antagonistic discourse in Estonia’s domestic information sphere (see Smith, 2008). 
Therefore, the counter-hegemonic national identity discourse has generated double-layered 
effects. One is the legitimisation of the privileged identity of Estonian singularity and the 
concept of media sovereignty. The other is the side-effect of the idea of Estonian 
singularity which entails Russophone population’s discourse of victimhood. 
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HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE DISCOURSE: NORMAL UNPEACE AS A 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT         
Before proceeding further, this section sets a stage for the conceptualisation of 
Estonia’s hegemonic strategic culture by engaging with the discursive construction of the 
strategic reality in Estonia’s information sphere according to which the strategic response is 
framed.20   
In Estonia, the nation-building project not only aims at returning to Europe but also 
“rejecting the Soviet past” (Smith, 2008, p. 421). Moreover, the “Return to Europe” 
discourse is based on “the notion of civilisation clash which loyalty to Estonia requires the 
hostility against Russia” (Feldman, 2001, p. 12). Therefore, Soviet/Russian identity stands 
in contrast to Estonian national identity. Simply put, the historical experience discourse 
juxtaposes the sign “Soviet” (e.g., Selg & Ruutsoo, 2014) and “Russia” (e.g., Mälksoo, 
2013) against “Estonia”. Estonia’s “nationalist narrative of being non-Soviet” (Kirch & 
Kirch, 1995) consequently encrusts Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat. 
Elaborating this point is crucial since Russia’s disinformation campaigns oftentimes 
employ Estonia’s own nationalist narrative against itself. For instance, Russian media 
sources claim that Estonia is sympathetic to fascism when the country re-interprets the 
narrative of Soviet liberating the Baltic states (Smith, 2008, p. 425). Such a narrative 
significantly impacts Estonia’s subject position as the construction of national identity 
cannot accommodate the “Other-within” such as the Russophone population. As a result, 
the representation of the Russian-speaking population as a potential threat to Estonia’s 
national self-understanding is still articulated but it is very much toned down.  
In this respect, the spectrum of possible strategic response to Russian hybrid threat 
is further conditioned by the historical experience discourse of normal unpeace in which 
the historical irreconcilability between Estonia and Russia is fortified as Bahovski (2008) 
noted that “Estonia is everything that is not Russia.” This condition is further translated into 
Estonia’s information sphere. With this historical experience discourse adding another 
                                                          
20 See Milliken (1999) for a detailed discussion on how discourses construct a social reality.  
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discursive layer to the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture, it can be argued 
that the constructed default setting of the information sphere with which Estonia is dealing 
encompasses two major components. One is Russia as a historically antagonistic neighbour 
incessantly feeding Russian version of historical narrative into Estonian information sphere, 
to wit the interpretation of the Second World War and the Soviet occupation of the Baltic 
states. The other is Estonia’s Russian-speaking population who has been constantly 
exploited by Russia especially through the available Russian media outlets. These have 
constructed a strategic reality in which the circulation of Russian antagonistic narratives in 
Estonia’s information sphere is seen as normality. Moreover, as Russian disinformation is 
generated almost on a daily basis through local Russian media outlets in Estonia’s 
information sphere, the distinction between war and peace in the information sphere has 
become blurred. Estonian Information System Authority’s 2015 Report affirmed this 
strategic reality and further included cyberspace as another threat-reproduction site: 
Estonia cannot ignore the fact that we are located next to Russia, which uses 
aggressive rhetoric, is constantly developing its cyber capabilities, and for 
whom activities directed against other states in cyberspace are merely an 
instrument to increase its influence […] (p. 5). 
The emphasis on geographical proximity shows the understanding that the aforementioned 
strategic reality is considered to be a given. Hence, it sustains the partial fixation of 
“Russia” as a natural adversary who incessantly produces conflicting information. 
Likewise, another strategic assessment pointed to Russia’s influence operations by 
diffusing provocative narratives: 
Estonia has to prepare for different scenarios and make itself as inconvenient 
opponent as possible. This will include work to further increase resilience 
against unconventional warfare, all kinds of diversionary acts and 
provocations, massive foreign propaganda, etc. (Praks, 2016, p. 52). 
The articulation of the recurrent theme of “Russia keeps generating antagonistic messages” 
affirms that wartime and peacetime are becoming indistinguishable. The condition of 
51 
 
unpeace as such appears as normality especially when construed through Estonia’s 
historical experience discourse in which the mutual fear between Estonia and Russia 
defines their security culture. Mölder (2010) argued that “the Great Fear is embedded in 
both Russian and Estonian practice of security culture” (p. 172). By virtue of this truth-like 
historical experience discourse, the strategic reality in Estonia’s information sphere is 
constructed in relation to the condition of normal unpeace. In this context, countering 
Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere is a part of the day-to-day normal 
antagonistic relationship as the information that both parties are articulating is based on 
mutually conflicting historical narratives. Otherwise stated, it is the strategic environment 
determined by the historical experience discourse which articulates Russia’s unabatedly 
chronic hostility in Estonia’s information sphere. Mihkelson (2017), for instance, lamented 
that:  
Depicting Estonia as a country that discriminates against minorities and 
promotes Nazism has been one of Russia’s largest and most consistent 
international deception operations in the last 25 years. The reasons […] 
being Moscow’s strategic interest in restoring its authority over the Baltic 
states. Russia became particularly assertive in the 1990s when Estonia and 
the other Baltic states were applying for the membership of NATO and the 
European Union.  
Likewise, Kaitsepolitseiamet (KAPO) 2015 Report also emphasises the endurance of 
Russian hostile information injected into Estonia: 
Information collected by the Internal Security Service clearly indicates that 
Russian special services persistently try to find or create possibilities to 
cultivate tension in Estonian society […] (Estonian Internal Security Service 
Review 2015).   
These discourses accentuate the temporal consistency of Russia’s informational hostility. 
They further imply the prolonged existence of such a threat in Estonia’s information sphere. 
This persistent hostility cannot be defeated inasmuch as this Great Fear discourse is 
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articulated. From this angle, the condition of normal unpeace characterises the strategic 
reality in Estonia’s information sphere. As the situation of normal unpeace neither suggests 
crisis nor the absence of conflict in the information sphere, the strategic response in such a 
context is thus located in the in-between space. This means that neither extraordinary 
measures nor inaction gains momentum. It is rather the limited response that is prevailing. 
To conclude, although the historical experience discourse is not always present in the 
public debate under investigation, it informs the scope of perceivable strategic response. It 
is thus a subtext to any strategic consideration in response to Russian hybrid threat in 
Estonia’s information sphere. This ultimately shows that the articulation of this discursive 
context does shape strategic culture by making normal unpeace in the information sphere a 
strategic reality.    
To summarise the previous sections, Estonia’s hegemonic political culture discourse 
– within which the concept of media liberalism and Western democratic identity are 
embedded – is employed to justify Estonia’s minimal response to Russian hybrid threat. In 
contrast, based on the notion of media sovereignty and Estonian singularity, the counter-
hegemonic national identity discourse buttresses a more restrictive response. The 
hegemonic historical experience discourse further adds up to the political culture discourse. 
As the strategic milieu of unpeace is constructed as normality, the security imperative for 
extraordinary measures is thus significantly marginalised, allowing the limited strategic 
response to gain currency.   
The next section demonstrates how certain security practices draw on the 
hegemonic discourses and how the counter-hegemonic discourse comes into play. The 
dominant security practices are characterised by the notion of minimalism which holds that 
Estonia’s appropriate strategic response to Russian hybrid threat must conform to the 
Western democratic identity by imposing limited restrictions in its information sphere. Two 
clusters of security practices are interrogated. The first cluster centres on the debate 
concerning ETV+, Sputnik, and PBK. The second cluster encompasses other forms of 
debunking practices which focus on reaching out to the people to provide the official 
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version of information. Both clusters are not mutually exclusive and they are the integral 
parts of current Estonia’s psychological defence strategy.     
ESTONIAN HEGEMONIC STRATEGIC CULTURE: MINIMALISM 
In engaging with Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat, it is 
necessary to consider the ongoing development in Estonia’s psychological defence strategy. 
In 2015, ETV+ – Estonia’s state-financed Russian-language television channel – was 
established. Shortly after that, the Kremlin-financed Russian news agency Sputnik asked 
for permission to open its media portals in Estonia, leading to the official authorisation in 
2016 (The Baltic Times, 2016). In 2017, the debate over the operation of the Kremlin-
friendly PBK in Tallinn had surfaced, showing the continued concern about Russian hybrid 
threat in Estonia’s information sphere. The three major events reflect two different strategic 
trajectories in managing Russian hybrid threat. Whilst one – the media nationalists –  
buttresses more assertive strategic posture, the other – the media liberalists – expresses 
support for the existing minimal response, showing uneasiness with the implementation of 
restrictive security policies in countering Russian hybrid threat. This cognitive gap between 
the two groups points to the different references to the underlying discourses: the 
minimalists subscribe to the concept of media liberalism whereas those supporting more 
restrictive measures embrace the notion of media sovereignty.   
In Estonia, the presence of Russia’s media channels is nothing new especially when 
there was no state’s Russian television channel until the establishment of ETV+. Moreover, 
media in a democratic society are expected to “allow political pluralism to express itself” 
(Shea, 1998). Therefore, having Russia’s media outlets as alternative sources seems 
initially unproblematic. Against the backdrop, arguably, Russia’s media outlets are not 
necessarily immediate threats to Estonian society. However, they have become explicitly 
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articulated as threats through public discourses after the Bronze Soldier event in 200721 and 
particularly in the context of Russia’s hybrid warfare. 
Since the inception of Russia’s Compatriots Policy, aiming essentially at 
influencing Russian-speaking populations abroad (Kudors, 2015), Estonia became seriously 
sceptical about Russian intentions on its Russophone minorities.22 Russian propaganda and 
disinformation against not only Estonia but also the West grew more intensified in the 
wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea (Paul & 
Matthews, 2016; Sadik, 2017). Moreover, the strategic assessment by Estonian official 
shows that Russia uses Estonia as a part of its Western confrontation strategy (Pommereau, 
2015). In the specific context of Estonia, the 2007 Bronze Soldier incident – where Russian 
propaganda largely inflamed the Russian-minority riots – revealed that the country’s 
societal cohesion can potentially be threatened by Russian influence operations. The event 
brought Estonia’s strategic focus to psychological defence which subsequently sparked the 
debate on how a democracy should respond to what is contemporarily called “hybrid 
threat”. The National Security Concept of Estonia adopted in 2010 acknowledged this 
strategic challenge: 
Estonia as a democratic and open society may also be affected by the spread 
of extremist, hostile or hate-based ideologies. This may weaken social 
cohesion, reduce tolerance and cause social tension. In the environment of 
open and free media, attacks against cohesion of Estonian society necessitate 
                                                          
21 Despite disagreement about the actual impact of Russian disinformation on the event (e.g., Crandall, 2014, 
p. 48), it is not a focus of this study which rather pays attention to the articulation of strategic over-
/underestimation of Russian propaganda reflected in public discourses. 
22 Nevertheless, Estonia does not question the loyalty of the Russophone population in the sense that the 
irredentist demand is out of the question (Schulze, 2009). This claim is supported by Estonian historical 
narrative concerning the events of the unlawful autonomy referendum in Narva and Sillamäe in 1993. The 
events are presented as the Russian minority demanding recognition rather than actual autonomy (See 
Eylandt, 2017).  
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greater attention to the sense of cohesion and psychological defence 
(Riigikogu, 2010, p. 8). 
The Concept singles out that media liberalism is susceptible to external threats and may 
lead to societal destabilisation. From this perspective, Estonia’s media liberalism could 
undermine societal psychological defence. An intertextual reading exhibits the trait that the 
sign “psychological defence” is projected into Estonia’s social integration policy discourse 
(Ministry of Culture, 2014). In this politico-security project, the sign “Russian-speaking 
population”, however, sits in a binary opposition. It is juxtaposed against the sign 
“Estonian-speaking population”. The National Defence Opinion Surveys – commissioned 
by the Ministry of Defence to gauge different political vibrations between Estonian and 
Russian speakers – help to illustrate this point. The way the surveys were conducted rests 
on the binary logic, treating Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations as two 
mutually exclusive groups (see Kivirähk, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). The surveys thus 
reveal a discursive rupture. In other words, in the official discourses, the articulations of a 
binary opposition imposed on Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations remain 
obvious (see Pawłusz, 2017, p. 267-268). With regard to the surveys, the use of neutral 
scientific language and objective methodology lead to the normalisation of dichotomous 
social categories. However, the surveys themselves are not politically neutral and they 
indirectly affect the strategic calculations in response to Russian hybrid threat. Put 
differently, they reproduce a binary reasoning, unavoidably pushing the Russian-speaking 
population to identify politically with the periphery. The side effect is significant because it 
potentially increases the credibility of Russia’s information sources. The subtle othering of 
Russian speakers is present in the social integration policy discourses which prioritise the 
singularity of Estonian-ness (Malloy, 2009). This demonstrates that the national identity 
discourse has come into play. This Janus-faced nature of Estonia’s integration project can 
be understood as “fictive pluralism which promoting pluralism conceals the singular-nation 
aim” (ibid., p. 245). This way of thinking is translated into the terrain of strategic 
consideration: 
56 
 
The national identity of both ethnic Estonians and Estonian Russians is 
influenced by the perception of threats: while Estonian Russians perceive, in 
particular, a threat to the preservation of their national culture, Estonians 
perceive a threat from Russia (Vetik et. al., 2015, p. 4).     
The bottom line is that the sign “psychological defence” – superimposed on the 
aforementioned binary opposition – makes “Russian-speaking population” a strategic locus. 
Therefore, it reinforces the assumption that media liberalism could widen the gap between 
the already informationally separated groups. Arisen from this premise is a series of debates 
on how Estonia – as a democracy – should deal with its media liberalism in the context of 
Russian hybrid threat whilst improving overall societal psychological defence. The 
National Defence Strategy adopted in 2010 highlighted the importance of psychological 
defence which is a part of the total defence principle: “The purpose of psychological 
defence is to prevent panic, the spread of hostile influences and misinformation, thereby 
ensuring continued popular support to the state and its national defence efforts” (Estonian 
Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 23). In addition, the anxiety about the radicalisation of 
Russophone population was a central theme in the aftermath of the 2007 Bronze Soldier 
(Ehala, 2009, pp. 152-154). For instance, the National Security Concept underscored that 
the values Estonia upholds are threatened by the non-democratic forces:  
Both states and non-state actors compete more actively in influencing the 
international media, public opinion and political decisions. […] The impact 
of distorted information may cause tensions in international relations, 
radicalisation of certain groups of people and harm social cohesion, adding 
to instability (Riigikogu, 2010, p. 3).   
Again, the Concept indirectly expressed concerns about media liberalism potentially 
leading to radicalisation. This worrying trend is supported by the research of Estonia’s 
International Centre for Defence and Security which proposes that “the threat to Estonia’s 
national security can, too, emerge internally with the incitement from outside” (Männik, 
2013, P. 37). Moreover, the former Estonian Minister of Defence Margus Tsahkna is of the 
same opinion. He remarked that in the context of the Bronze Soldier event, the 
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dissemination of Russian propaganda was very powerful. It incited hatred in young people 
who are exposed to it (Lasn, 2017).  
In response to the above-mentioned strategic challenges, one of the most striking 
security practices in improving Estonia’s psychological defence is the launch of ETV+. 
This highlights Estonia’s strategic response which resonates with the widely articulated 
political culture discourse which draws on the privileged identity of Western democracy. 
Therefore, “a democracy does not fight propaganda with propaganda” (personal 
communication, 2018, January 22). Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid’s speech at the 
opening of the Riga StratCom Dialogue in 2017 was one of the most obvious articulations 
of this discourse. The President emphasised: “It is important not to counter propaganda 
with propaganda. It is important to teach people the merits of honest and open discussion” 
(Kaljulaid, 2017). The encouragement to uphold media liberalism and the principle of 
democracy re-enacts the hegemonic articulation of political culture discourse on which the 
choice of establishing ETV+ to improve societal psychological defence stands. 
Furthermore, the hegemonic political culture discourse tries to reconstruct the relationship 
between Estonia’s Russian-speakers and Russia by distancing them from Russia’s political 
gravity. Doing so destabilises the binary opposition between Estonian- and Russian-
speaking population and establishes a new dichotomy between Estonian and Russian 
information sphere as manifested in KAPO’s 2014 Report: 
Despite years of Russian influence operations and garish lies in the Russian-
government controlled media, the vast majority of Estonia’s Russian-
speaking population can easily distinguish the hostile propaganda in Estonia 
(Estonian Internal Security Service, 2014, p. 7). 
The political culture discourse thus brings about reworking of the sign “Russian-speaking 
population” by presenting them as the non-radical. This moderates the general disturbance 
in Estonia society. The hegemonic articulation of political culture discourse in the past few 
years clearly emphasises that Russian-speaking population does not undermine democracy 
and media liberalism. The ensuing politico-security effects are substantial because such a 
discourse portrays Estonia’s Russian-speaking population as a victim of Russian 
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propaganda rather than the radical proponent of the current Russian regime. Therefore, 
Estonia’s Russophones are considered not to be a threat to the Western democratic identity. 
The exploitative connotation ascribed to Russia further breaks the chain of equivalence that 
links the sign “Russian-speaking” and “radicalism”, showing a successful externalisation of 
the threat once considered to be internal. For instance, President Kersti Kaljulaid expressed 
her view on the impact of Russian propaganda on Estonia’s Russian-speaking population 
that: “Some Putin radicals speak very good Estonian. We have to make sure we do not take 
anybody’s language as a marker for what they think” (Weymouth, 2017).  
The President’s comment signals an emergence of a new representation of Estonia’s 
Russophone population, materialising through the rhetoric of “Russian-speaking population 
is not a threat anymore”. It significantly moves away from the narrative that Russian-
speaking population is manipulated by Russia. An implication of this discursive 
amelioration of the category “Russian-speaking population” for Estonia’s strategic response 
to Russian hybrid threat is immense because it abates the need for restrictive security 
measures. Simultaneously, it fosters the notion of media liberalism as a justification for the 
minimal strategic posture. The political culture discourse thus frames the security policies 
in response to Russian hybrid threat in a significantly less securitised language, confining 
them to a day-to-day political issue such as societal integration project (see Ministry of 
Culture, 2014). It is precisely this articulation of the political culture discourse which 
mediates Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat by projecting the security 
matter into a democratic political frame. Therefore, this discourse produces a mutual 
gravitation between security and normal politics, neutralising the exceptional imperative 
carried by the securitising discourse (see Aradau, 2004). Counterintuitively, the dominant 
discourse after Russian annexation of Crimea depicts the Russophone population in a more 
positive light rather than treating them as a threat to societal cohesion albeit being in a 
separate information sphere. For instance, Kasekamp (2015) pointed out that, despite 
sharing sympathy with Russia to a certain degree, the Russian-speaking population “does 
not want Russian intervention in Estonia” (p. 3). Defence Minister Margus Tsahkna, 
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likewise, insisted that “Estonia is not deeply divided along the ethnolinguistic line 
anymore” (Lasn, 2017). 
The endeavour to construct a new category of Russian-speaking population results 
in the articulation which affirms that the influence of Russian propaganda on the country’s 
Russophone population can be confined to the political problem of trust in the state. As 
neither another riot nor autonomous claim is likely to happen (Veebel & Ploom, 2016, p. 
54), this problem can be solved through democratic mechanisms. In this sense, security 
concerns spawned out of radicalisation of Russophone population have been gradually 
fading away from the political space. In this respect, Estonia’s strategic vision is based on 
the prioritised logic of enhancing the centre’s political attractiveness in order to talk the 
periphery into the core’s political gravity. This clearly reflects the Western democratic 
tradition. Accordingly, in the course of de-peripheralisation, security in the country’s 
information sphere can be achieved without infringement on media liberalism. The 
representation of the centre (Estonian state) is, moreover, connected with the teleological 
idea of social betterment in a Western democracy. The articulation of political culture 
discourse thus ascribed such a normative connotation to the floating signifier “Western 
democracy”, attempting to prioritise Estonia’s political orbit around which Russian-
speaking population can revolve. Putting it into Estonia’s strategic context, the identity of 
Western democracy would magnetise the Russophone populations. Thus, the impact of 
Russian media would be diminished (personal communication, 2018, February 23). Any 
ban on Russian media is thus not necessary.  
In effect, this political culture discourse unties the concept of media liberalism from 
the connotation that it may destabilise Estonian society. Hence, improving psychological 
defence does not necessarily point to the security measures curbing media liberalism such 
as banning or more legal constraints. On the contrary, media liberalism can enhance 
societal security by enabling Russophone population to create their own narrative 
independent of Estonian and Russian influences. As Ilmar Raag – the ex-adviser on 
strategic communication at Estonian Government Office – said that “the TV station 
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(ETV+) will seek to ‘empower the local identity’ while the government is clear of any 
editorial control” (Ummelas, 2015). 
Moreover, as a Western democracy, Estonia provides an alternative fact-check 
source rather than imposing excessive regulations. This discursive pattern shows that the 
sign “fact” is rearticulated into the equivalential chain centred on the concept of “Western 
democracy”, echoing the founding principle of ETV+. This is a value grading practice 
shaping the understanding of “appropriateness” in the formulation of strategic response. For 
instance, when critiquing the EU’s naïve understanding of Russian propaganda, Urmas Paet 
– Estonian Member of the European Parliament – submitted:  
The most effective way to stand against propaganda and false news is to 
qualify yourselves […] European journalists must be professionals. One 
must return to the principal rules of classic journalism. All facts must be 
checked. One must be critical of information sources and take into 
consideration that not every Russian media publication is a trustworthy 
source (The Baltic Times, 2018).  
President Kersti Kaljuliad’s speech at the opening of the Human Rights Conference in 2016 
further pronounced this version of appropriateness in countering propaganda. She accepts 
that “freedom of speech and openness” – the fundamental elements of Estonian society – 
have been put into question whether they provide a fertile ground for propaganda. But the 
best way to counteract is to encourage free exchange of opinions standing on fact-based 
knowledge in the society (Kaljulaid, 2016). Her remarks clearly draw on the hegemonic 
political culture discourse. The discourse further demarcates the limit of the strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat. The security practices which are not in congruence with 
this liberal imperative are filtered out, considered as measures beyond the conceivable 
strategic response in a Western democracy. Depending on non-fact media platforms as 
countermeasures is, for instance, excluded from the strategic spectrum as Raag & Günter 
(2016) wrote that “Estonia is an exemplary case because, in response to the Kremlin’s 
narratives, we upheld the principle of an open and democratic society and did not 
implement censorship nor anti-propaganda campaigns against the Kremlin” (p. 8). This 
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affirms the appropriateness of the establishment of ETV+ as a non-propagandistic media 
channel. The political culture discourse further highlights the persuasive potential of ETV+ 
as a fact-disseminating security practice. Considered to be liberal-democratically 
appropriate in integrating the Russian-speaking population, ETV+ is assigned to reduce the 
influence of Russia’s media in Estonia by providing an alternative information source in 
parallel. President Kersti Kaljulaid championed this strategic move: 
We can hear very pro-Estonian views in Russian and very pro-Russian 
views in Estonian – language doesn’t indicate anything […] What is 
important is people know that Estonian Public Broadcasting is the place 
where they can find trustworthy information […] This is the most important 
thing as we are at the forefront of the propaganda war (ERR, 2017d). 
This view is shared not only amongst the country’s political elites but also officials 
in the defence circle. General Riho Terras – the current commander of the Estonian 
Defense Forces – advocated that the objective of ETV+ is to make Russophone population 
“more satisfied with the country” (Pommereau, 2015). A similar support for ETV+ as an 
appropriate security practice can be found in Ilmar Raag’s remark, affirming that “the 
essence of democracy is that we try to persuade people. The debate with each other is 
clearly accepted” (Raag, 2018). The above statements reflect Estonia’s Western democratic 
identity, affirming that disagreement within a democratic frame is welcomed. This shows 
that the “agree to disagree” rhetoric serves as a guiding principle for the appropriate 
response to Russian hybrid threat to Estonia’s information sphere.23 Drawing on the 
hegemonic political culture discourse, the launch of ETV+ is thus considered as an 
appropriate strategic response to Russian hybrid threat. At the gist of this security practice 
lies the strategic imagery of Estonia avoiding media censorship and allowing its people 
including the Russian-speaking population to choose from which media they want to get 
information. Estonia thus strategically responds to Russian hybrid threat by upholding the 
tenet that a free society will be immune from this threat if the public is well-informed and 
                                                          
23 From my personal communication, all interviewees agree on this point. 
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can freely exercise individual choice of media consumption. This again reproduces 
Estonia’s Western democratic identity. 
Furthermore, this liberal undertone emboldens a liberal interpretation of the state’s 
strategic documents. For instance, Lipre-Järma (2016) pointed out that the overarching aim 
of Estonia’s strategic communication is to ensure the values cherished in the Preamble of 
the Constitution including “democratic principles, rights and freedoms” (p. 121). Merle 
Maigre (2015) – the security policy advisor to the president of Estonia – reiterated that “it is 
critical not to jeopardise liberal democratic values in the fight against Russian hybrid 
threats” (p. 6). KAPO’s 2015 Report is the epitome of this trajectory: “The main duty of the 
state is to counter Russian media manipulations by democratic means, with legal certainty 
and consistency” (Estonian Internal Security Service, 2015, p. 9). The key leitmotif in those 
statements is the concept of Western democracy. From this perspective, the sign 
“psychological defence” has become identified nicely with the hegemonic political culture 
discourse despite initially criticised as being incompatible with a democratic society 
(Jermalavičius & Parmak, 2012). Hence, that Estonia has not adopted illiberal strategic 
choices such as blocking the broadcast of Russian television channels or restricting Russian 
media outlets shows that such choices are restrained by its Western democratic identity. 
Although ETV+ is paradoxically more popular amongst Estonian-speaking audiences (The 
Baltic Times, 2015), its strategic significance cannot be overlooked. The discursive 
crossover within the hegemonic articulation of political culture discourse – where the 
concept of media liberalism, the reworking of the category “Russian-speaking population” 
and the reproduction of Estonia’s Western democratic identity interact – facilitates the 
minimalisation of Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat.  
However, the antagonistic forces challenging the political culture discourse 
simultaneously present themselves through disapproving voices bewailing the insufficiency 
of ETV+ to counter Russian hybrid threat. The national identity discourse is playing a 
crucial role in justifying more restrictive regulations imposed on Estonia’s information 
sphere. Expressing discontent about the lack of sufficient control over Russia’s media 
outlets in Estonia, Estonian linguist Urmas Sutrop lamented that Estonia has been 
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preoccupied with managing the information sphere of Russophone population whilst 
ignoring the penetrative impact of Russian propaganda on Estonian-speaking population. 
He stated that Estonia may “lose Estonian-speakers to Russian propaganda” (Sutrop, 2014). 
His remark draws on the concept of media sovereignty which justifies the critique of the 
existing minimal strategic response. Moreover, the anchor of ETV’s programme – 
Aktuaalne Kaamera – suggested that more restrictions can be justified inasmuch as they are 
in the interest of the people. To quote, “while we mumble about democracy, hostile 
propaganda has done its work” (ERR, 2014). As already argued, the notion of media 
sovereignty is built on the national identity discourse in which Estonian singularity needs to 
be preserved. The intertextual reading of the above comments illustrates that although 
media liberalism is the value to be upheld, it can be suspended under certain circumstances. 
An Estonian scholar Mikhail Lotman, moreover, underscored the problematic nature of 
applying the idea of media liberalism in the society: “When we enact freedom of speech, 
we assume that there are only intelligent people. But there are all kinds of people. They also 
have the right to express their feelings” (Ammas, 2018). In addition, a myriad of suggestive 
texts carries a message that Estonia should be more careful with Russian propaganda (see 
Sazonov, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Pommereau, 2015).  
At the crux of this national identity discourse pitched against the minimalists is the 
affirmation of the privileged right of the titular community to defend their ethnonational 
interests. It is precisely this discourse that the nodal point “media sovereignty” is fixing. In 
a similar vein, general Ants Laaneots – the former the Commander of the Estonian Defence 
Forces – said even before the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea that Estonia should step 
up its psychological defence measures (Tänavsuu, 2011). The volunteer-based group 
entitled Propastop24 has also been urging the government to come up with a plan to inform 
the public what is an “appropriate response” to Russian hybrid threat (Leivat, 2017). 
Tailored to the debate on appropriate strategic response, the aforementioned views suggest 
that the existing measures are not enough to counter Russian hybrid threat. Therefore, more 
actions are needed.   
                                                          
24 Propastop is Estonian blog run by volunteers with an objective to expose propaganda. 
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Furthermore, ETV+ met with Russian reaction claiming that it is Estonia’s 
propaganda television channel (Postimees, 2015). It is evident that Russia has attempted to 
use the discourse of victimhood developed by the Russophone population in the 1990s to 
dislocate the hegemonic articulation of political culture discourse. Russian discourse in this 
respect seeks to recreate the binary opposition between Estonian- and Russian-speaking 
population.25 In response to this criticism, Darja Saar – the editor-in-chief of ETV+ – 
replied that “ETV+ isn’t meant to influence anyone. It rather produces quality content 
serving Estonia’s Russian- and Estonian-speakers alike” (Saar, 2017). Additionally, the 
former Defense Minister Hannes Hanso concurs that: “ETV+ is not a mouthpiece for 
government […] and in the long run, the best defence against propaganda is factual, 
trustworthy, (and) good journalism” (Pommereau, 2015). His comment is in line with the 
media liberalism argument which emphasises the quality of democratic journalism 
(Encabo, 1995). In short, the hegemonic political culture discourse encounters two major 
antagonistic forces. One from domestic national identity discourse whereas the other is 
from Russian discourse localised into Estonia’s domestic articulation. Despite facing 
double discursive pressures, Estonia’s political culture discourse remains hegemonic. This 
confirms Estonia’s limited response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere is 
mediated by the political culture discourse of Western democracy in that it disqualifies 
excessive media regulations and media censorship whilst spotlighting the operation of 
ETV+.  
Shortly after kicking off ETV+, another series of debate arose when the Kremlin-
financed news agency Sputnik submitted a request for permission to open its media portals 
in Estonia, leading to the official authorisation in 2016. It is reasonable to ask why Sputnik 
is allowed to operate in Estonia despite the country being susceptible to Russian 
propaganda. Moreover, Estonian elites were aware of the potential threat Sputnik might 
pose to Estonian society. For instance, Estonian elites saw Sputnik “as part of Russia’s new 
                                                          
25 The representation of Estonia’s Russophone population in Russian discourses as a homogeneous group 
discriminated by Estonian state does not correspond with the reality (personal communication, 2018, February 
22). See also the categorisation of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population in Kaukvere (2018). 
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hybrid information war” (Pettai & Ivask, 2017, p. 8). Responding to Sputnik’s work in 
Estonia, some state organisations such as the Security Police Board expressed its intention 
to deny cooperation with the Kremlin-manipulated news portal (Põld, 2016). Propastop 
group is particularly vigilant and keeps an eye on Sputnik’s news content which the group 
explicitly calls propaganda (Propastop.org, 2017). Broadly speaking, Sputnik clearly 
encountered a lot of unwelcome gestures from Estonian public, but the permission to work 
in Estonia was eventually granted. Reading this phenomenon intertextually, it can be 
argued that, the point of confrontation between the different discourses underlying the 
notion of media liberalism and media sovereignty reawakens the question of an appropriate 
response to Russian hybrid threat. What makes Sputnik debate qualitatively different from 
the previous ETV+ debate is that it reveals that security practices are governed by the logic 
of political correctness articulated by the hegemonic political culture discourse. This logic 
manifests itself through socially-recognised political correctness which predetermines any 
security practice. The logic of political correctness draws extensively on the hegemonic 
political culture discourse. Accordingly, the hegemonic articulation of political culture 
discourse predefines Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat. This sheds light 
on the political incorrectness of media censorship. The following debate helps to illustrate 
this point. When Olga Ivanova – a member of the Riigikogu and the Estonian Centre Party 
(ECP) – gave an interview to Sputnik. She received critical opprobrium from several 
Riigikogu members (ERR, 2017b). In response to the criticisms, premier Jüri Ratas forbade 
his party members from giving an interview to Sputnik (Mäekivi & Mihelson, 2017). 
However, Ms. Ivanovale justified her action by claiming that “in a way, all media outlets 
are propagandistic and I will give an interview to any media channel” (Nagel & Vasli, 
2017). Her argument essentially accentuated the value of media pluralism in that different 
views ought to be present in various media outlets (Raeijmaekers & Maeseele, 2015, pp. 
1044-1045). In a separate event, when asked about her interview with Sputnik, Yana Toom 
of the ECP responded: “I will definitely not be subjected to media bans” (ERR, 2017a). Her 
justification reiterated the principle of freedom of expression which resonates with the 
political culture discourse. In effect, the rearticulation of political culture discourse into the 
political vindications reproduces the political incorrectness of censorship. In other words, it 
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brings uncontestable universal values – the floating signifiers – into local context to 
legitimise certain political claims. This practice creates conditions of possibility for certain 
domestic political forces to tap into the discursive resource of Western democracy. Hence, 
such political vindications justify the operation of Sputnik in Estonia and reinforce 
minimalism in Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat. As the hegemonic 
political culture discourse relies primarily on the universal value of liberalism, 
transgressing it by exercising censorship would be politically incorrect. This “prior 
commitment to liberal democracy” excludes any illiberal interpretations opposing the 
universal values (Tonden & Thomassen, 2005, p. 4). The implication of the politically 
correct logic for the implementation of security practices in the information sphere is 
immense because it practically predefines which practices (e.g., censorship and interview 
ban) are politically incorrect.   
In sum, Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threat is additionally shaped 
by the rearticulation of the hegemonic political culture discourse into certain political 
vindications. This reproduction of the liberal democratic identity adds another discursive 
variant to the designation of appropriate strategic response. This discursive variegation 
predefines which security practice is politically correct. In this case, the authorisation of 
Sputnik operation in Estonia is seen as politically correct. Thus, the hegemonic political 
culture discourse is used to justify the liberal-democratically correct security practices built 
on universal values (e.g., freedom of expression). With this prescriptive register, it would 
be politically incorrect should more strictures are imposed on Russian media outlets. This, 
in a nutshell, suggests that Estonia’s minimal strategic response is locked in the liberal-
democratically correct obligation articulated by the political culture discourse. This makes 
the limited response to Sputnik (e.g., non-cooperation) appropriate and “normal”.   
Furthermore, the major debate about the appropriate strategic solution to Russian 
hybrid threat revolves around the operation of Kremlin-friendly PBK in Tallinn. The topic 
of this debate is whether TTV – Estonia’s television station based in Tallinn – should 
purchase programmes from PBK in order to adequately connect with its Russian-speaking 
population who usually watches the channel. This issue is particularly controversial in the 
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context of Russian hybrid threat as President Kersti Kaljulaid and Justice Minister Urmas 
Reinsalu unequivocally demurred against the idea, implying that Estonian singularity is at 
stake. The Justice Minister remarked that: “Estonia’s public institutions should send a 
signal by not buying commercial time there anymore. The sums which public institutions 
have spent on airtime are not large, but it is a matter of principles” (The Baltic Times, 
2018). Likewise, the President expressed her opinion that:  
The transfer of public money to the unfamiliar television channel – such as 
the PBK – should be stopped immediately. […] Tallinn Television could 
join ETV+. If we say that PBK is important for our country because we 
reach our people through this channel, what does this mean? (Postimees, 
2017). 
In a separate occasion, the President even encouraged that “one must have the courage to 
stand up for oneself when one suspects the other side of manipulating public opinion to 
serve its interests” (Hussar, 2017). The above prescriptive advice brings back one of the 
classic topics central to strategic culture scholarship, namely the perception of threat. Those 
opposing the purchase of PBK’s television programmes by TTV consider that PBK is a 
source of propaganda which destabilises societal cohesion (Põld, 2018b). Moreover, former 
Minister Marju Lauristine noted that the operation of PBK is a “cultural influence” 
inducing Russophone population to support the Kremlin narratives (Velsker, 2017). Illmar 
Raag further commented that “any financial contribution to PBK means supporting Russian 
national media operations” (ERR, 2017e). The assumption on which the PBK sceptics rely 
reflects the counter-hegemonic national identity discourse. In other words, it exhibits 
Estonian elites’ deeply rooted belief in the concept of Estonian singularity which is the only 
legitimate centre of political gravity. Unsurprisingly, “the idea of official bilingualism” 
(Estonian and Russian) was ruled out from the nation-building project (Danjoux, 2002, p. 
245). Drawing on the national identity discourse, the PBK sceptics highlight the importance 
of Estonia’s media sovereignty, reflecting the privileged right conferred on titular media 
outlets. Erik Roose – the Chairman of the National Broadcasting Board – even supported 
the idea that ETV+ – the Estonian-made television channel – should be the authoritative 
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communication channel (Randlab, 2017). In other words, they demand that a certain degree 
of nationalisation of Estonia’s information sphere be achieved in order to improve societal 
psychological defence. However, there are those showing approval of PBK operation in 
Estonia. In response to the PBK sceptics, Vadim Belobrovtsev – the deputy Mayor of 
Tallinn – defended the purchase: 
It should be noted that Estonia has not done much of its homework for a 
long time and ETV+ was launched only a few years ago. Currently, it 
remains significantly behind PBK in terms of viewership and it is natural 
that the city uses the most visible channel to connect with the Russian-
speaking population (Pealinn, 2017). 
Moreover, Premier Jüri Ratas publicly responded to the Riigikogu that from his own 
experience, “PBK has not distorted the government’s messages or spread disinformation” 
(Põld, 2018a). Vsevolod Jürgenson – the member of Tallinn local parliament – even opined 
that the criticisms against the affiliation between TTV and PBK show “misunderstanding 
amongst Estonians that Estonia’s Russophones are under the influence of Russia” 
(Jürgenson, 2017). Jürgenson’s argument particularly echoes the Kantian liberalist idea that 
“individuals possess a fundamental capacity for moral autonomy” (Crowder, 2013, p. 39). 
Therefore, the PBK defenders draw on the hegemonic political culture discourse and 
instrumentalise it to support the existing minimal security practice in the information 
sphere.   
For those seeing PBK in a less problematic fashion, their arguments rely on the 
construction of PBK as a non-threat category. According to PBK defenders, the real threat 
is – as Premier Ratas said – “the essential and necessary information does not reach the 
local Russian-speakers” (ERR, 2017c). However, as illustrated above, the PBK sceptics 
consider the channel as a threat. These two contradictory perceptions of threat further 
unveil the disparity in domestic political attitudes towards PBK in particular and, by 
extension, towards Russia. Consequently, two preferences for strategic response are 
competing over the hegemonic position. For instance, the PBK sceptics generally agreed on 
a certain degree of nationalisation of information sphere in which priority is conferred on 
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Estonian media outlets such as ETV+. Therefore, TTV dissociating itself from PBK would 
improve the overall effectiveness of strategic communication, leading eventually to better 
psychological defence (see Aeg, 2018; Eilat, 2017). This argument again reflects the 
national identity discourse within which the concept of Estonian singularity is embedded. 
The argument pitched against PBK sceptics by the defenders reflects Saart’s (2012) 
multicultural democratic model which is articulated by the hegemonic political culture 
discourse. In other words, the PBK defenders draw on the notion of multiculturalism 
carried by the political culture discourse to justify their claims. Their version of 
multiculturalism emphasises the cultural accommodation which, in turn, conditions 
strategic response by demarcating the limit of appropriate interpretations of threats. This 
further reinforces Estonia’s Western democratic identity. Simply put, the framing of 
strategic response must accordingly accommodate, or at least take into account, the notion 
of multiculturalism. This framing creates an equivalential relation between the notion of 
media liberalism and multiculturalism which renders the partnership between PBK and 
TTV appropriate. Hence, more assertive response – such as the nationalisation of the 
information sphere – is excluded from the range of appropriate strategic response as it 
challenges Estonia’s Western democratic identity. Moreover, the underlying liberal 
political force not only re-enacts the hegemonic articulation of Estonia strategic culture but 
also delegitimises nationalist sensibility articulated by the national identity discourse. For 
the defenders, societal psychological defence could be undermined if precluding the 
operation of PBK from Estonia’s information sphere because it would foment distrust 
amongst the Russophone population (Jürgenson, 2017). In this respect, their multiculturalist 
gesture delegitimises the need to put pressure on Russian media outlets. Hence, the 
rearticulation of political culture discourse into the debate on PBK operation in Tallinn 
legitimises Estonia’s multiculturalist information sphere26 which rests on the privileged 
identity of Western democracy. Accordingly, Estonia’s minimal strategic response to 
Russian hybrid threat has become legitimised and normalised.              
                                                          
26 See Kymlicka (1996) for the discussion on the relationship between multiculturalism and liberalism 
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In order to gain a complete understanding of this minimal strategic response, it is 
crucial to bring the dimension of domestic party politics into a spotlight because of the 
affiliation between the ECP and the political support from the Russophone population 
(Kund, 2018a). In particular, Samorodni (2017) and Eslas (2018) argued that the ECP – 
which is the most popular party amongst Russophone populations – has gained political 
benefits from Russian disinformation localised into Russia’s media outlets in Estonia 
especially through PBK. The bearing of this political convergence on Estonia’s security 
practices in response to Russian hybrid threat is significant because ECP’s agenda can 
affect the decision on strategic response by reproducing the legitimacy of the existing 
minimal security practices, namely the non-restriction on PBK and TTV partnership and 
the non-nationalising of the information sphere. To sum up, drawing on Estonia’s Western 
democratic identity, the PBK defenders successfully legitimise the partnership between 
PBK and TTV based on the idea of media multicultural-liberalism. This consequently 
filters out the more assertive strategic response the PBK sceptics have proposed. As the 
hegemonic operation renders the aforementioned minimal security practices appropriate, 
the illiberal alternative practices are excluded from Estonian strategic frontier.  
Finally, the last set of security practices to be examined is debunking practice which 
is manifested through official’s strategic communication outreach. Analysing the 
debunking practice is of crucial importance because such a practice is a site in which the 
hegemonic political culture discourse is reproduced. This entails constant normalisation of 
Estonia’s limited response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. Estonian 
official definition of strategic communication reaffirms this interpretation: 
Prerequisites for strategic communication in Estonia are democracy and 
freedom of speech, meaning that government communication is only one of 
many competing voices beside opposing parties, business organisations, 
citizens’ associations, and foreign communication (Republic of Estonian 
Government, 2018). 
Accordingly, the debunking practice is put in the range of appropriate strategic response to 
Russian hybrid threat as it conforms to the liberal democratic principles. Moreover, 
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strategic communication as a form of security practice rests on the concept of good 
governance and empowerment. Therefore, these two categories serve as nodal points 
stabilising the meaning of appropriate response in debunking practice discourse. Hence, the 
underlying political legitimacy of such a discourse further creates the conditions of 
impossibility for the strategic response that relies on the crackdown of Russian media 
outlets. Praks (2015) affirmed that in response to Russian hybrid threat, “good governance 
will decrease vulnerabilities” (p. 233). Regarding empowerment, it refers to the practice of 
debunking propaganda and providing official narrative. But it is still up to an individual 
person to choose which media outlets to rely on (personal communication, January 24, 
2018). In other words, the objective is to improve media literacy and competence (Teperik, 
2018) in both Estonian- and Russian-speaking community alike in order to achieve better 
societal psychological defence (see e.g., Mihelson, 2015; Kiin, 2017; Kund, 2018b). 
Anchoring itself in the Western democratic identity, the debunking practice discourse has 
become considered as one of the appropriate modes of strategic response to Russian hybrid 
threat in the information sphere. For instance, when asked about the support of Estonia’s 
Russophone population for the NATO troops, the Minister of Health and Labour Jevgeni 
Ossinovski – a native Russian-speaker himself – said that: “Probably for the next years, so 
for the foreseeable future, this (reaching out to Russian speakers) will be more visible” 
(Scrutton & Mardiste, 2017). Recently, the Estonian government has also reached out to the 
Russian-speaking population to provide the official information especially in the issues that 
misunderstanding takes place such as the presence of NATO troops in Estonia. (personal 
communication, 2018, January 24). This strategic gesture has been constantly made 
especially in the past few years. In particular, Narva – an Estonian city with predominant 
Russophone population – has gained more space in the public discourses. Put differently, 
through the debunking practice, the hegemonic political culture discourse attempts to 
connect the sign “Narva” with the Western democratic identity. In this respect, the political 
culture discourse has provided a reference for such a semantic link as illustrated in 
Kasekamp’s view who sees Narva as a part of Western democracy:  
72 
 
Russia has been able to influence the under-developed societies in Crimea, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia where basic human rights are still practically 
absent. In contrast, Narva can be considered as a Western European city 
with residents expecting rule of law and a full range of civil protections 
(Leivat, 2017). 
This view is clearly advocated by President Kersti Kaljulaid (Pommereau, 2018). 
Moreover, the President’s promise to relocate her office to Narva for a period of one month 
(Vahtla, 2017) underpins the equivalential relation between Narva and Western democracy. 
This political signal is in itself a strategic posture whose objective is to disconnect Russian-
speaking population from the political periphery. Furthermore, this Western democratic 
representation of Narva simultaneously dislocates Russia as a frame of political reference 
on which Russophone population relies. This shows the intention of political restructuring 
to expand the horizon of the hegemonic articulation to include the antagonistic sign. 
Through the political culture discourse, “Narva” – once seen as an antagonistic sign – is 
rearticulated into the chain of equivalence by linking it to “the West” instead of “Russia”.  
The articulation of political culture discourse has further expanded the equivalent 
relation between “Narva” and “Europe.”27 This has grown apparent especially in the 
context of Russia/Europe binary opposition. Europe is thus presented as an opportunity for 
a better future vis-à-vis Russia. This strategic posture also targets the “hearts and minds” of 
the Russophone population by countering Russian psychological influence through the 
projection of a better alternative. Kasekamp (2014) commented shortly after the 2014 
Russian annexation of Crimea that: “People in Narva can, of course, see across the river 
and see that life is not better in Ivangorod in Russia, so they are happy where they are.”  
Furthermore, President Kersti Kaljulaid’s support for Narva’s candidacy for the 
2024 European Capital of Culture is a clear testimony to the de-peripheralising strategy 
through which the sign “Narva” is relocated to the political gravity of the West. For 
                                                          
27 European Union’s version of Europe. It should be noted that Russia also offers a vision of Europe in 
parallel. See further discussion on this issue in Morozov (2005).  
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instance, the President remarked: “I go to Narva to be with the people there. […] Narva is 
not a dispiriting place. Narva is a city that is caught in the typical post-industrial trap, and 
we will climb out of it together” (Cavegn, 2018). The President defined Narva in an 
economic term, connecting the city with the positive change towards a better future as a 
part of Estonia and Europe. This particular rearticulation dislocates Russia’s discourse 
which presents Narva as an isolated and maltreated region. In short, such a debunking 
practice through the public outreach has reinforced the minimalist strategic trajectory in 
countering Russian hybrid threat by reworking the sign “Narva” and rearticulating it into 
the hegemonic political culture discourse. The implication of this discursive dynamics is 
crucial because it reaffirms the position of Estonia at the centre of the Western democratic 
society (Mälksoo, 2013). In other words, with the sign “Narva” detached from “Russia”, 
Estonian’s subject position can accordingly be firmly posited in the centre of the West. 
Being at the core, in turn, ensures Estonia’s overall security as Riigikogu member Marko 
Mihkelson (2016) remarked:   
Estonia must belong to the centre of the Western allies. We have to improve 
the lobbying skills when solving problems and discussing security questions 
that are important to us, whether this involves shaping a common policy for 
the Western allies’ relationship with Russia or influencing the root causes of 
the migration crisis.  
Moreover, former Estonia’s foreign minister Keit-Pentus Rosimannus along with Danish, 
English and Lithuanian foreign ministers came up with a non-paper calling for measures 
against Russian hybrid threat (Bruxelles2, 2015). This partly leads to the establishment of 
EU’s East StratCom Task Force which deals with Russia’s disinformation campaigns 
against EU member states. Hence, in response to Russian hybrid threat in its information 
sphere, Estonia also contributes to the work of the EU’s East StratCom Task Force in 
Brussels and NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga (personal 
communication, 2018, January 24). During its presidency of the EU Council, Estonia also 
pushed the agenda of combatting Russian disinformation onto the EU level (Mihkelson, 
2017). At the EU Summit in 2016, former Estonian Premier Taavi Rõivas even raised the 
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issue of permanent funding for EU Strategic Communication Task Force (EU 
StratComm) to counter Russia’s disinformation (ERR, 2016). In fact, Estonia has sent a 
national staff on its own budget to the East StratCom Task Force (personal communication, 
2018, January 22). This Estonia/the EU/NATO triangle in the strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat creates an all-embracing frame of reference within which a liberal-
democratically informed code of strategic conduct – such as the aforementioned debunking 
practices – has become appropriate. Tapping into this discursive province, Estonia’s 
hegemonic liberal political force can legitimately stabilise the equivalential relationship 
between the West and Estonia which re-enacts the hegemonic articulation of Estonia’s 
minimal strategic culture. This further normalises societal experience of minimalism in 
strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere (see e.g., Tuomela, 
2002, pp. 40-77). In this respect, Estonia’s limited response as such instantiates the very 
same discursive dynamics as constitutes the floating signifier “Western democracy” itself.  
In theory, Estonia could tighten security practices to improve psychological defence 
rather than implementing the aforementioned debunking practices. For instance, it can 
establish certain criteria regarding the transparency of media ownership28 or impose stricter 
monitoring of information flow on the information sphere (Sazonov, 2015). However, 
Estonia has not publicly entertained such proposals. Critics of this minimalist approach to 
strategic response nonetheless argued that the existing security measures in dealing with 
Russian hybrid threat are not sufficient. For instance, Vladimir Sazonov commented that: 
Raising awareness is not enough. […] It is also necessary for the Baltic 
countries to develop their own media and to pay more attention to the 
Russian television and press in order to better monitor what kind of 
information they give to the target audiences – the Russian-speaking 
residents of the Baltic countries (Sazonov, 2016b). 
                                                          
28 This issue was discussed in a high-level conference on hybrid threat organised during Estonia’s EU 
Presidency in 2017 (See European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017, p. 3). 
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From a defence perspective, the concern is that “Estonia cannot protect itself from Russian 
hybrid threat without considering more assertive measures in its information sphere” 
(personal communication, 2018, February 6). Likewise, accepting that there are Kremlin 
sympathisers in the EU member states including Estonia, the former Foreign Minister 
Jürgen Ligi warned that “a very big issue is the capacity for psychological resistance” 
(Diplomaatia, 2015). However, as no uncompromising strategic response to Russian hybrid 
threat is prevailing apart from the significant increase of strategic communication budget to 
enhance psychological defence (ERR, 2018), it can be argued that there is no crucial shift 
in Estonia’s minimalist strategic orientation. The endurance of this trajectory largely results 
from the reproduction of Estonia’s Western democratic identity through the debunking 
practice as illustrated above. 
To conclude this chapter, the empirical analysis yields significant insights into 
Estonia’s strategic behaviour and, in particular, the way the hegemonic articulation of 
Estonian strategic culture mediates its strategic response to Russian hybrid threat in the 
information sphere. At the beginning of this chapter, the study has laid out three discourses 
which shape Estonia’s strategic behaviour. It is argued that the hegemonic articulation of 
Estonian political culture discourse carries an imprint of the Western democratic identity 
which is, in turn, sustained by the concept of media liberalism. Referencing to the notion of 
media liberalism allows certain Estonian elites to justify the existing minimal strategic 
response to Russian hybrid threat. Therefore, the imposition of stricter security measures, 
the crackdown and ban of Russian media outlets, and the nationalising of the information 
sphere are deemed unsuitable and excluded from the hegemonic articulation as they 
challenge Estonia’s privileged identity of Western democracy. Through such a hegemonic 
articulation, the floating signifier “Western democracy” is localised into Estonia’s political 
culture discourse and provides legitimacy for the minimalist approach to strategic response 
to Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere. Estonia’s appropriate response is 
manifested through a variety of security practices, namely the establishment of ETV+, the 
authorisation of Sputnik media portals to operate in Estonia, and the cooperation between 
PBK and TTV. The representations of these security practices resonate with Estonia’s 
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Western democratic identity. Hence, they become a site in which such an identity is 
reproduced. The hegemonic political culture discourse further delegitimises certain security 
practices which carry the antagonistic signs, namely censorship, counter-propaganda-with-
propaganda and media ban. Those signs are excluded from the hegemonic articulation since 
they challenge the principle of Western democracy. In this respect, appropriate security 
practices are formulated in compliance with the liberal-democratic standard of correctness. 
Furthermore, this pre-defined political correctness, too, shapes Estonia’s strategic 
orientation by handcuffing it with the liberal universal values. In short, an appropriate 
strategic response must be liberal-democratically correct.  
In addition, the concept of multiculturalism which is (re)produced through the 
hegemonic articulation of political culture discourse facilitates a discursive reworking of 
the category “Russian-speaking population” and “Narva”. Both signs – once being 
considered as antagonistic signs – are projected into a new chain of equivalence centred on 
the privileged identity of Western democracy. This leads to a new perception of threat in 
that Estonia’s Russophones are not necessarily a threat to the societal cohesion. Thus, the 
need for stricter security measures has become significantly less urgent. By tapping into the 
discursive resource underlying the EU and NATO’s liberal strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat in the information sphere, Estonia’s debunking practice has become 
legitimised. This further normalises the minimal strategic response. Another discourse 
underlying Estonia’s minimal strategic response is the hegemonic historical experience 
discourse which is articulated in tandem with the political culture discourse. The historical 
experience discourse has constructed a strategic reality in which strategic response occurs. 
This reality is characterised by the condition of normal unpeace within which the never-
ending circulation of conflicting and hostile narratives from Russia in Estonia’s information 
sphere persists. This makes the distinction between wartime and peacetime impossible. 
This strategic reality articulated by the hegemonic historical experience discourse adds 
another discursive layer onto the strategic consideration. Consequently, neither decisive 
security measures nor inaction gains momentum. Eventually, the articulation of normal 
unpeace strategic reality rather steers the response towards a middle ground in a strategic 
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spectrum. Although Estonia’s minimal strategic response to Russian hybrid threat is 
currently a dominant mode, there exist challenging political forces amplified through the 
counter-hegemonic national identity discourse. This discourse embraces the notion of 
Estonian singularity which is the basis of the nationalising approach to strategic response. 
Those subscribing to this orientation champion more restrictive strategic response and 
justify their demand by referencing to the concept of media sovereignty. However, the 
prevailing minimal strategic response suggests that the counter-hegemonic national identity 
discourse remains at the border of the strategic spectrum. The absence of the public 
deliberation about extraordinary security measures in the information sphere – such as a 
temporary ban on Russian television broadcast or censorship of Russian media – further 
reaffirms that the illiberal security practices are currently beyond the acceptable range of 
strategic response.    
Finally, Estonia’s adoption of minimal strategic response does not necessarily 
suggest that the country could achieve less security. In contrast, such a limited response 
locates Estonia’s subject position at the ideational centre of European security architecture 
and thus enhances Estonia’s overall security. President Kersti Kaljulaid’s remark nicely 
summarises this point:  
Democracy, personal freedoms and respect towards the principles of a state 
based on the rule of law are the cornerstones not just for the security 
architecture of our countries, but for the international community in general 
(Office of the President, 2018).    
Echoing the President’s opinion, Mölder (2016) reiterated that “democratic values will 
mitigate the impact of security threats Estonia is currently facing.” The constellation of 
Estonia’s minimal security practices outlined above is subsequently consolidated within 
and simultaneously constitutes the hegemonic strategic culture. The hegemonic articulation 
of this strategic culture of minimalism mediates the country’s strategic response to Russian 
hybrid threat in its information sphere in that the restrictive security practices are filtered 
out. At the same time, the minimal response is rendered appropriate and normal as it 
resonates with Estonia’s privileged identity of Western democracy.  
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CONCLUSION 
The research has studied Estonian strategic response to Russian hybrid threat with a 
focus on the mediating effects of the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture. It 
utilises the poststructuralist discourse theory and the concept of strategic culture as a 
theoretical framework. This line of inquiry rests on the how-possible scheme of thought 
which has guided the research towards the investigation of a range of perceivable 
appropriate response which depends on the hegemonic articulation of certain discourses. In 
the light of such an intellectual enterprise, the study has developed an interpretive frame by 
conceptualising strategic culture as a discursive context through which certain security 
practices have gained momentum and are considered to be the appropriate and “normal” 
response. Given an ongoing discussion on an appropriate response to Russian hybrid threat 
in the West (see e.g., Weitz, 2014; Pawlak, 2017), the case of Estonia offers a fertile ground 
for the empirical analysis precisely because the domestic debate on this matter draws 
special attention to the ideational aspects of strategic behaviour, hinting at the underlying 
discourses at work.  
In this study, three essential aspects are highlighted, namely political culture, 
historical experience and national identity. For Estonia, the presence of Russia’s media 
outlets in its information sphere has become perceived as a hybrid threat because the 
representations within which Russian media are embedded are discursively constructed and 
articulated as a threat to the cohesion of Estonian society. In this respect, the study shows 
that the concept of Russian hybrid threat is not an independent category which can be 
objectively identified. Instead, it comes into existence as such as a result of the meanings 
ascribed to it and the impression with which it is discursively attached (see Dunn & 
Neumann, 2016, p. 3). Moreover, as the study specifically examines Estonia’s information 
sphere which is discursively linked with the nonmilitary dimension of Russian hybrid 
threat, the concept of strategic culture – traditionally confined to the politico-military 
domain – need be refashioned in order to better capture the dynamics of the phenomenon 
under study. This brings about two disciplinary critiques of the study of strategic culture. 
The study not only reconceptualises the approach to the enquiry of strategic culture but also 
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underscores the need for the broadening of the concept itself. The reframing of such a 
concept has reinvigorated its instrumentality in the empirical analysis in that it helps to 
single out the historico-cultural dimension of nonmilitary security practices under 
investigation.           
As regards the discursive analysis, the study has yielded significant insights into the 
understanding of Estonia’s strategic response to Russian hybrid threats in the information 
sphere as follows. First, the triad discursive nexus between the hegemonic political culture 
discourse, the counter-hegemonic national identity discourse and the historical experience 
discourse as a strategic context has enabled the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic 
culture. In the light of the debate about the appropriate response to Russian hybrid threat in 
Estonia’s information sphere, the concept of media liberalism embedded in the political 
culture discourse is used as a point of reference for those who champion the minimalist 
approach to strategic response. For them, restrictive security measures imposed on the 
country’s information sphere are deemed as incompatible with Estonia’s privileged identity 
of Western democracy. On the contrary, the counter-hegemonic national identity discourse 
produces an antagonistic force attempting to dislocate the political culture discourse by 
articulating the notion of media sovereignty. The argumentation based on such a concept 
accentuates the need to secure Estonia’s information sphere by adopting more assertive 
security practices which prioritise titular media outlets at the expense of Russia’s ones. At 
the radical end of the assertive spectrum, there is a call for the restriction on certain Russian 
media outlets. However, the supporters of this response are extremely marginal.  
Second, in response to the main research question, this study has found that the 
hegemonic articulation of Estonia’s strategic culture has mediated its strategic response to 
Russian hybrid threat in the information sphere by defining a range of appropriate strategic 
response through which the minimal security practices become legitimised. In other words, 
it is a practice of delimitation which demarcates the frontier of the possible response. In 
response to the supplementary research question, this study has found that Estonia’s limited 
response has become considered as a normal response because it resonates with the 
country’s privileged identity of Western democracy. Therefore, the theoretical expectation 
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of this study is confirmed. Minimalism in Estonia’s strategic culture rests essentially on the 
country’s Western democratic identity. Accordingly, the hegemonic articulation of 
Estonian strategic culture simultaneously reproduces this privileged identity. This attests to 
the mutually constitutive relationship between the two concepts. The reiteration of Western 
democracy ultimately shows that it has constituted the cornerstone of appropriateness in 
Estonia’s strategic response. Otherwise stated, Estonia’s strong Western democracy identity 
has significantly influenced its strategic response. Through this particular lens, security 
practices that conform to this standard of appropriateness are further constructed as the 
“normal” response. The prominent evidence is offered by the debunking practice through 
which the minimal strategic response becomes institutionalised. Interrogating Estonian 
strategic response additionally reveals that Estonian strategic culture has a disciplinary 
power in that it regulates Estonia’s subject position as a Western democracy (see Dunn, 
1997, pp. 690-693). Otherwise put, it forbids certain illiberal security practices that are not 
in synchrony with liberal-democratic correctness. From the analysis, such practices include 
the ban on politicians giving an interview to Russian media, the restrictions on Russian 
media outlets and the extreme preferences bestowed to titular media outlets. In this respect, 
the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture keeps the country’s strategic 
horizon under the minimalist approach. The implication of such a strategic posture for 
Estonia is significant because it shows that presenting itself as a quintessential Western 
democratic country is not only resulted from the historical experience which posits 
Soviet/Russia as a significant Other (Mälksoo, 2013) but also the strategic self-positioning 
at the normative centre of the Euro-transatlantic security architecture. This demonstrates 
that strategic response can be considered simultaneously as a part of the identity-
reproducing process in the context of the incessant fluctuations of meanings and the 
inherent unstableness of the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture. Therefore, 
Estonia’s strategic response itself has provided a meaning for the floating signifier 
“Western democracy”.  In the light of such a process, Estonian strategic culture is 
nonetheless subject to constant alterations. Thus, the dominant liberal political force 
sustaining it is compelled to police the resistance from the competing forces which in this 
case are the illiberal forces.  
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Third, the absence of articulated alarmist discourses urging for immediate 
restrictions imposed on the country’s information sphere reaffirms Estonia’s adherence to 
the minimalist approach. In particular, this absence can also be accounted for by the 
articulation of Estonia’s historical experience discourse as a subtext shaping the perception 
of war and peace. It creates a strategic milieu of normal unpeace in which the hostility 
between Estonia and Russia is constructed as a reality. Therefore, inasmuch as the 
discourse of mutual fear is articulated, the condition of unpeace will be reinforced. Taking 
Estonia’s information sphere into consideration, the response to Russian hybrid threat is 
thus guided by the logic of normal unpeace through which neither extraordinary measures 
nor inaction is considered to be appropriate.  
Fourth, the scrutiny of the rearticulation of Estonian strategic culture into different 
political domains discloses the instrumentalisation of the hegemonic discourse in the formal 
political arena. This means that certain actors may draw on such a discourse to achieve their 
political goal. In this respect, Estonia’s limited response to Russian hybrid threat is also 
influenced by the strategic preference of the ECP party whose political vindications 
establish an equivalential relation between the concept of multiculturalism and Estonian 
political culture. The rearticulation of Estonia’s political culture discourse into the domain 
of party politics has thus discredited the challenging political forces which advocate the 
concept of Estonian singularity. From this angle, the political vindications exemplify the 
political struggles underlying the hegemonic articulation of Estonian strategic culture. This 
only confirms the study’s finding that the Western democratic identity is a point of 
reference for political legitimacy as it provides a discursive resource for not only political 
claims but also strategic culture.        
With regard to the theoretical implications, the findings of this study challenge the 
claim that small states are generally expected to enhance security to ensure their survival 
(see e.g., Veselý, 2007; Browning, 2006). In particular, it challenges the view that Estonia’s 
historical experience during the Soviet occupation leads to the assertive security policy 
towards Russia (Jurkynas, 2014). The argument drawn from the insight of this study is that 
small states are still leaning towards the maximisation of security but strategic culture as a 
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discursive context also influences strategic behaviour. To put another way, security is not 
always the overarching goal since identity and strategic culture can also override security 
concerns. Therefore, this study provides a more nuanced and balanced understanding of 
states’ strategic response to the perceived threats. However, as the study relies solely on 
Estonian strategic texts, the insights obtained in this study are specific to the case of 
Estonia. It does not offer a generalisable explanation. Nonetheless, the poststructuralist 
approach to the study of strategic culture developed in this study can potentially be applied 
to a variety of other cases in which the debate on the appropriate response to Russian 
hybrid threat has emerged such as Latvia (Rislakki, 2014). The analytical vantage points of 
this study’s interpretive frame are its sensitivity to the context and clear discursive markers 
which inform the relationship between each semantic category and its location in the 
discursive structure.          
Despite the discursive analysis has confirmed that Estonia’s minimal response is 
mediated by the hegemonic articulation of the strategic culture, it is necessary to reflect on 
the alternative explanations. They should be understood in the light of this study’s 
limitations. As a small state, Estonia’s limited resources can be factored in (Veebel, 2015). 
However, as shown in this study, Estonia has refrained from employing the existing 
capabilities in its information sphere since they are interpreted as illiberal/non-Western 
democratic security practices. The external discursive pressures either from the EU or 
Russia on the domestic interethnic politics between Estonian- and Russian-speaking 
population may, too, indirectly influence Estonia’s response to Russian hybrid threat 
(Schulze, 2018; Hoffman & Makarychev, 2017). Nonetheless, as this study has 
demonstrated, the strong mediating effects of strategic culture are produced by the domestic 
discourses. Hence, the impact of exogenous discursive pressure can be limited. In addition, 
Estonia’s neoliberal economic trajectory (Notermans, 2015, p. 103) may constrain the 
imposition of regulations on the country’s information sphere. However, it can still be 
interpreted as a result of the diffusion of Estonia’s Western democratic identity into the 
economic sphere. All in all, drawing on the empirical analysis, the study reaffirms its 
findings as well as the theoretical expectation.  
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Finally, regarding the avenue for future research, the insights gained in this study 
can be put into the comparative perspective. A comparison with other Baltic countries or 
Poland can potentially produce a comprehensive regional strategic outlook. Positing the 
concept of strategic culture on the ground of practice theory is another viable prospect 
because it could yield a thick description about each security practice under study. Practice 
theory which focuses on the day-to-day security practice as an object of analysis may 
provide a deeper analysis of states’ strategic response vis-à-vis textual analysis.       
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APPENDIX I – The Corpus of Estonian Strategic Texts 
Author/Organisation Text Year Category 
Riigikogu National Security Concept of Estonia 2010 Official 
document 
Ministry of Defence National Defence Strategy  2010 Official 
document 
Estonian Internal 
Security Service 
Estonian Internal Security Service Review 2014 Official 
document 
Estonian Internal 
Security Service 
Estonian Internal Security Service Review 2015 Official 
document 
Raivo Vetik et. al./ 
Ministry of Culture* 
Estonian Society Monitoring 2015 2015 Official 
document 
Estonian Information 
System Authority 
Annual Report of the Estonian Information System Authority’s Cyber Security 
Branch. 
2015 Official 
document 
Juhan Kivirähk/Ministry 
of Defence * 
Public Opinion and National Defence 2015 Official 
document 
Juhan Kivirähk/Ministry 
of Defence * 
Public Opinion and National Defence 2016 Official 
document 
Juhan Kivirähk/Ministry 
of Defence * 
Public Opinion and National Defence 2017 
(Mar.) 
Official 
document 
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Juhan Kivirähk/Ministry 
of Defence * 
Public Opinion and National Defence 2017 
(Oct.) 
Official 
document 
Republic of Estonian 
Government 
Strategic communication 2018 Official 
document 
-/Reuter Disquiet in Baltics over sympathies of Russian speakers 2014 Official 
document 
Kersti Kaljuliad/ 
President of Estonian 
Republic 
Presidendi kõne inimõiguste konverentsil: kui me tahame, et meid kuulataks, 
peame end arusaadavaks tegema 
2016 Official speech 
Kersti Kaljuliad/ 
President of Estonian 
Republic 
President of the Republic at the Opening of the Riga StratCom Dialogue 2017 Official speech 
Office of the President President Kaljulaid in the White House: the Baltic states and USA are on the axis 
of good 
2018 Official press 
release 
Taivo Tänavsuu/Eesti 
Ekspress 
Ants Laaneots: mina küll ei käi Moskvas „Ameerikat avastamas“ 2011 Journalistic 
report 
Helen Mihelson/ 
Postimees 
Ümarlaud: Vene propaganda vastu võitlemise asemel tuleb pakkuda alternatiivi 2015 Journalistic 
report 
Isabelle de Pommereau/ 
Deutsche Welle 
Estonia woos Russian speakers with local TV 2015 Journalistic 
report 
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Ott Ummelas/ 
Bloomberg 
Estonia Must Counter ‘Hostile’ Russian Propaganda, Adviser Says 2015 Journalistic 
report 
-/ERR Estonia calls for permanent funding for task force countering Kremlin 
propaganda 
2016 Journalistic 
report  
-/The Baltic Times Kremlin-backed Sputnik News Agency Opens Estonian Branch 2016 Journalistic 
report 
Lally Weymouth/The 
Washington Post 
‘Russia is a threat’: Estonia frets about its neighbor 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Otti Eylandt/Delfi Narva ja Sillamäe referendum näitas, et Ida-Virumaad ei tohi unustada 2017 Journalistic 
report 
-/Postimees President Kaljulaid: Tallinna Televisioon ja ETV+ võiks liituda 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Vesker Liis/Postimees Marju Lauristin: Eesti uudiste näitamine Vene telekanalis omab palju sügavamat 
kultuurilist mõju 
2017 Journalistic 
report 
Riho Nagel & Karoliina 
Vasli/Delfi 
Jüri Ratas kutsus Olga Ivanovat korrale: Sputnik on propaganda tööriist 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Mirjam Mäekivi & 
Helen Mihelson/ 
Postimees 
Keskerakond Ivanovale: Sputnikuga ei räägita 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Aili Vahtla/ERR Kaljulaid, President’s Office to relocate to Narva for one month next fall 2017 Journalistic 
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report 
-/Pealinn Belobrovtsev: opositsiooni kritiseerib linnavalitsust seoses PBK-ga 
valeväidetega 
2017 Journalistic 
report 
-/ERR MP Ivanova flouts Center Party ban, gives Russia’s Sputnik interview 2017 Journalistic 
report 
-/ERR Ratas ja Ossinovski toetavad koostööd PBK-ga 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Taavi Eilat/ERR Janek Luts: PBK-lt reklaami ostmine annab legitiimsuse ka kanali muule infole 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Propastop.org/Postimees Propastop: Sputnikut võib Eestis teatud tingimusel läbikukkunuks lugeda 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Sven Ranlab/Postimees ERRi juht toetab presidendi ideed liita Tallinna TV telekanaliga ETV+ 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Sverre Lasn/Delfi Sõduri intervjuu kaitseministriga: Eesti ei tohi kunagi enam üksi jääda 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Alistair Scrutton & 
David Mardiste/ Reuters 
Wary of divided loyalties, a Baltic state reaches out to its Russians 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Hussar Lauri/ Postimees President Kaljulaid: the most important thing is to notice and talk 2017 Journalistic 
report 
Oliver Kund/ Postimees Russian network could have determined winner of Tallinn election 2018 Journalistic 
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report 
Oliver Kund/ Postimees Stratcom to be strengthened 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Anna Põld/Postimees Ratas finds PBK has not distorted messages 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Anna Põld/Postimees Vabaerakond tahab keelata maksumaksja raha eest ajakirjanduslike saadete ja 
reklaami ostmise 
2018 Journalistic 
report 
-/The Baltic Times Estonian justmin: State shouldn’t buy air time from PBK 2018 Journalistic 
report  
-/The Baltic Times Estonian MEP Paet: EU should be less naive regarding Russian propaganda 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Isabelle de 
Pommereau/The 
Christian Science 
Monitor 
As Estonia turns 100, a new embrace of its Russian speakers 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Dario Cavegn/ERR President visits Narva for introduction of 2024 culture capital campaign 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Anneli Ammas/ 
Postimees 
Taking offence is not only Estonia’s problem 2018 Journalistic 
report 
Laas Levas/Estonian Any parallels between Catalonia and Ida-Virumaa? 2017 Non-official 
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Life opinion 
Laas Levas/Estonian 
Life 
Military Technology – tanks, cannons, rockets, helicopters etc. What about 
information? 
2017 Non-official 
opinion 
Sirje Kiin/Estonian Life Kommentaar: Meedia Vastutus Infosõja Olukorras 2017 Non-official 
opinion 
Urmas Sutrop/ 
University of Tartu 
Urmas Sutrop: Russia launches propaganda in Estonian 2014 Expert’s opinion 
Andres Kasekamp/ 
University of Tartu 
Why Narva is not Next 2015 Expert’s opinion 
Viljar Veebel/Baltic 
Defence College 
Russian Propaganda, Disinformation, and Estonia’s Experience 2015 Expert’s opinion 
Ilmar Raag & Aleksei 
Günter/ Estonian 
government 
communication office** 
Eesti strateegilise kommunikatsiooni kilde 2016 2016 Expert’s opinion 
Henrik Praks/ICDS NATO Warsaw Summit – Implications for Estonia 2016 Expert’s opinion 
Holger Mölder/ Tallinn 
University of 
Technology 
Rohkem Julgeolekut ≠ Julge Olek 2016 Expert’s opinion 
Vladimir Sazonov/ The Kremlin’s Total Information Warfare with No Moral Boundaries 2016 Expert’s opinion 
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Estonian National 
Defence College 
Vladimir Sazonov/ 
Estonian National 
Defence College 
Kremlin’s infowar in the Baltics 2016 Expert’s opinion 
Vello Pettai & Pille 
Ivask/ University of 
Tartu & Äripäev 
Nation in Transit Country Report 2017: Estonia 2017 Expert’s opinion 
Dmitri Teperik/ICDS Countering Disinformation: The Danger of Hype—and Ignorance 2018 Expert’s opinion 
 
Ilmar Raag/Former 
Government Advisor 
Ilmar Raag: sõna “propaganda” on muutunud sünonüümiks kõigele, mis ei 
meeldi 
2018 Expert’s opinion 
Merle Maigre/security 
policy adviser to the 
president 
Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and 
Recommendations for NATO 
2015 Official’s 
opinion 
Jürgen Ligi/Former 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
On Russia, Shelters and Female Conscripts—The Big Election Debate in 
Diplomaatia 
2015 Official’s 
opinion 
Marko Mihkelson/ 
Member of the 
Successful Foreign Policy: The Battlefront of Estonian National Security 2016 Official’s 
opinion 
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*The report is commissioned by the Ministry but the author is not the Ministry’s official.  
**The paper was written when the authors were officially working for the government communication office but it does not 
necessarily reflect Estonian government’s position. 
 
Riigikogu  
Liis Lipre-Järma/ 
Adviser, Office of the 
President 
Communication at times of Hostile Propaganda: Case of Estonia 2016 Official’s 
opinion 
Marko Mihkelson/ 
Member of the 
Riigikogu 
Disinformation: Russia’s Old but Effective Weapon of Influence 2017 Official’s 
opinion 
Vsevolod Jürgenson/ 
Member of Tallinn City 
Parliament 
Keskerakondlane: PBK ja ETV+ ei ole süüdi, et paljud meie kaasmaalased 
saavad oma informatsiooni idast 
2017 Official’s 
opinion 
Raivo Aeg/ Member of 
the Riigikogu 
Raivo Aeg PBKst: teavituskampaaniate ostmine mõjutuskanalilt on lühinägelik 
ja ohtlik 
2018 Official’s 
opinion 
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APPENDIX II – Semi-structured interview questions 
Disclaimer 
1. These semi-structured interview questions are part of Master’s Thesis to be 
submitted to Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu and 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. 
2. In order to comply with University College London’s ethical requirement, the 
interview will be completely anonymous and confidentiality will be fully 
guaranteed. 
3. The interviewer will not collect any personal and identifiable information. 
4. The interview will be recorded and strictly used for academic purpose only. 
Questions 
1. How do you understand Russiaʼs hybrid war strategy? 
2. Is there any other hybrid warfare strategy that Russia uses against Estonia?    
3. To what extent do you think Estonia’s information sphere is affected by Russia’s 
hybrid threat?/To what extent it destabilises Estoniaʼs societal cohesion?   
4. Before Crimean annexation in 2014, what were the Russian threats Estonia 
concerned most? 
5. After the Crimean annexation in 2014, has Russiaʼs hybrid strategy become more 
intensified in Estonia? 
6. What kind of disinformation is being/was articulated? 
7. Which channel does Russia use to spread disinformation?  
8. What does your organisation do to improve Estonia’s security in the context of 
Russiaʼs hybrid warfare?  
9. What are the counter-measures already taken in order to respond to Russian hybrid 
threat?  
10. Are there any countering disinformation measures before the Crimean annexation in 
2014? 
11. In your opinion, how should a democratic country respond to Russiaʼs hybrid 
threat?   
12. What should have been done in order to improve Estonia’s psychological defence? 
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APPENDIX III – List of interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewee Organisation Date 
Anonymous, state official Estonian Information 
System Authority 
22 January 2018 
Anonymous, security expert International Centre for 
Defence and Security 
22 January 2018 
Anonymous, state official Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24 January 2018 
Anonymous, security expert Baltic Defence College 6 February 2018 
Anonymous, security expert University of Tartu/Estonian 
National Defence College 
22 February 2018 
Anonymous, media expert University of Tartu 23 February 2018 
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APPENDIX IV – Propaganda and disinformation case against Estonia 
Propaganda and disinformation cases from 2015 to February 2018 are compiled from the 
following sources.  
1. EU’s East StratCom Task Force, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/  
2. Propastop’s, https://www.propastop.org/eng/  
3. CEPA’s StratCom Programme, http://infowar.cepa.org/Countries/Estonia  
Date Title Source of Origin 
4 February 2018 Baltic countries don’t 
oppose Nord Stream 2 
anymore 
Vesti nedeli s Dmitriem 
Kiselyovym @Rossiya 1, 
01:23 
23 January 2018 Maarjamägi, military planes 
and sprats 
Rubaltic and Izvestija 
21 January 2018 Economies of the Baltic 
countries can’t make 
progress in the EU 
Sputnik Lithuania, Vesti 
18 January 2018 All three Baltic states are 
disappearing 
Rubaltic.ru 
18 January 2018 Censorship in the Baltic 
states 
Rubaltic.ru 
16 January 2018 Putin turns out to be the 
most popular politician on 
the Latvian TV in 2017 
Sputnik Latvia, Sputnik 
Estonia, RIA Novosti, 
Telegraf.lv, Baltnews, 
Life.ru 
25 December 2017 Estonia and Lithuania seek 
to improve relations with 
Russia without preconditions 
Argumenti y fakti, 
Ukraina.ru 
1 December 2017 Europe will become Muslim Utro.ru, Rosbalt, RIA 
Novosti, Sputnik Estonia 
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30 October 2017 Estonia has opened a new 
military base in the town of 
Tapa under the pretext of 
fear of a Russian attack. 
cz.Sputniknews 
17 October 2017 Since 1991, the leaders of 
Latvia and Estonia have 
constantly been threatening 
Russia, and now the same 
threats are heard from 
Poland 
Vremya pokazhet @Pervyi 
kanal, 26.54 
25 September 2017 Finland, Estonia and 
Hungary are pushing 
Russia’s Finno-Ugric 
peoples to separate from 
Russia 
Komsomolskaya Pravda 
21 September 2017 Latvia and Estonia have 
claims for Russian 
territories, Poland wants to 
seize Ukraine and Belarus, 
Romania Transnistria 
Pravo Golosa @TV Centr, 
24:30 
16 July 2017 During World War II, most 
of the Baltic Forest Brothers 
were members of Waffen-
SS. They are responsible for 
the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of Jews. 
Vesti nedeli @ Rossiya 1 
16 July 2017 The presidential elections in 
Estonia are not at all a 
democratic procedure. 
sputnik.com 
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13 July 2017 A NATO film glorifies the 
Baltic Nazi collaborators 
known as the “Forest 
Brothers.” 
rt.com 
6 July 2017 Russophobe and fascist 
Estonia persecutes the 
participants of the “Immortal 
Regiment” procession. 
rusvesna.su 
31 May 2017 Kersti Kaljulaid, President 
of Estonia, has informed 
“Deutsche Welle” that she 
strictly follows orders that 
are dictated by Brussels and 
Washington when dealing 
with Russia. 
“Mesto vstrechi” (55:48, 
56:09) 
19 February 2017 The Baltics and Ukraine 
belong to the “Russian 
world”, so Moscow would 
make a pre-emptive strike 
against Europe if NATO 
puts its troops there. 
“Voskresnyi vecher s 
Vladimirom Solovyovym” 
(2:13) 
23 January 2017 Trump will no longer take 
care of the Baltic states and 
other U.S. allies in Europe. 
RuBaltic.ru 
7 January 2017  Estonian President refused 
to congratulate Orthodox 
Christians on Christmas 
Baltnews.lv 
19 October 2016 Estonia (and all three of the 
Baltic states) are preparing 
NTV 
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for war with Russia. 
25 September 2016 The US ambassador to 
Estonia, James Melville, 
criticised the Estonian 
presidential election system, 
saying that it does not reflect 
the views of the population. 
baltnews.ee 
17 March 2016  Estonia is building a 
concentration camp for its 
Russian-speaking citizens 
 
politobzor.net 
12 November 2015 Estonian tax-payers are 
covering medical costs of 
the Ukrainian “effaceurs 
soldiers” 
kompravda.eu 
9 November 2015 Estonia is a racist country, 
where people are 
discriminated based on their 
ethnic and racial 
background. 
rg.ru 
7 November 2015 Estonia is infringing on 
media freedom with the ban 
of Rossiya Sevodnya and 
that this is not the first time 
Estonia is breaking the rules 
and preventing Russian 
media from broadcasting in 
Estonia. 
sputniknews.com 
 
 
